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THE RIGHT TO POSTHUMOUS BODILY INTEGRITY
AND IMPLICATIONS OF WHOSE RIGHT IT IS
Hilary Young*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. BODY WORLDS & BODIES THE EXHIBITION: A MORAL
CONTROVERSY
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1. See generally Lisa Giunta, The Dead on Display: A Call for the International
Regulation of Plastination Exhibits, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 164 (2010) (giving
background on the exhibits and the legal and ethical issues raised by these exhibits).
2. See generally BODY WORLDS, http://www.bodyworlds.com/en/prelude.html
(last visited May 14, 2013).
3. See generally BODIES THE EXHIBITION, http://www.bodiestheexhibition.com
(last visited May 14, 2013).
4. Jason Rhodes, Body Worlds Plans Cadaver Show Dedicated to Sex, REUTERS,
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Millions of people in dozens of cities around the world have
flocked to museum exhibits of preserved human cadavers.1 The
best-known versions of the exhibits, Body Worlds2 and Bodies: The
Exhibition,3 aim to be both educational and artistic. The dead are
posed as though they were riding a skateboard or performing a
trapeze routine. One man is displayed as though his body were
exploding, so that the viewer can see many anatomical systems
simultaneously. A fetus still inside its dead mother is on view,
and in a Body Worlds exhibit in Berlin, bodies were posed as
though they were having sex. Stripped of flesh, the copulating
cadavers caused controversy, which is nothing new for these
boundary-pushing exhibits.4
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There are essentially three types of moral objection that can
be levied against this kind of display of human corpses. A
dignitary argument might claim that it is undignified to display
human bodies in this manner or to display bodies for profit.
That is, it harms the living human public to treat our dead in this
way. Such dignitary concerns explain why, for example, we
legally require the dead to be disposed of (usually buried or
cremated) in a dignified manner or why states have criminal
prohibitions on the undignified treatment of a corpse.5 As a
society, we recognize the possibility that undignified treatment
of the dead can harm the living public as a whole. This potential
criticism of preserved cadaver exhibits may be independent of
any prior consent by the deceased. If one thinks it undignified to
put corpses on public display for profit, one may think this
regardless of whether the deceased consented (although one
may think it less undignified if there was prior consent).
A second potential objection to Body Worlds-type displays of
human cadavers is the harm such use of corpses could cause to
the friends and family of the deceased. Although bodies are
rendered anonymous by removing skin, hair, and other
identifying features, families could object to the very idea of
their loved one’s remains suffering this fate. This differs from
the indignity example above in that the harm here is not to
humanity in general, but rather to specific individuals by virtue
of their relationship with the deceased. Friends and family have
a well-recognized interest in the treatment of loved one’s mortal
remains and this interest is recognized in laws that grant
possessory rights in a corpse to next of kin and allow next of kin
to make decisions about the treatment of the body – either
regardless of, or in the absence of, the expressed wishes of the
deceased.6
A third potential objection to preserved cadaver exhibits
relates to harm to the individuals themselves, either before or
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Sept. 11, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58A4Z220090911.
5. See discussion infra Part IV.
6. See id.
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7. Press Release, N.Y. State Attorney General, Cuomo Settlement With
“bodies. . . .the Exhibition” Ends the Practice of Using Human Remains of Suspect
Origins (May 29, 2008), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/cuomosettlement-bodies-exhibition-ends-practice-using-human-remains-suspect-origins.
See also Sewell Chan, ‘Bodies’ Show Must Put Up Warnings, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM
BLOG (May 29, 2008, 12:14 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/
05/29/bodies-exhibit-must-put-up-warnings/.
8. Press Release, N.Y. State Attorney General, Cuomo Settlement With
“bodies. . . .the Exhibition” Ends the Practice of Using Human Remains of Suspect
Origins (May 29, 2008), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/cuomosettlement-bodies-exhibition-ends-practice-using-human-remains-suspect-origins.
9. See discussion infra Part IV.
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after their death. This potential objection best explains the policy
of seeking the individual’s consent. In fact much of the
controversy over Bodies: The Exhibition relates to a lack of prior
consent by the people whose bodies were used. For example,
New York governor Andrew Cuomo reacted with concern to the
fact that Premier Exhibitions, the company responsible for
Bodies: The Exhibition, was unable to establish consent for this use
of the bodies.7 It was alleged that some of these bodies were
those of executed Chinese prisoners.8
This third potential objection is not unique to the display of
cadavers: there are many laws that reflect the importance of
posthumous bodily integrity by granting individuals the right to
make decisions about the treatment of their future corpses.
These include organ donation law and laws that allow one to
choose burial or cremation, as well as laws governing Body
Worlds-type displays.9 This article examines such laws granting
individuals the right to make decisions about the treatment of
their future corpses. It asks whether these laws aim to protect
only the rights of living individuals in order to give them
confidence their wishes will be respected, or whether they
protect the dead as well. It also examines the implications for
policy of whether the dead are viewed as capable of having
rights in relation to their bodies. For example, if all rights are
viewed as ending at death, it may be easier to justify procuring
organs from those whose wishes about organ donation are
unknown, even in the absence of consent.
It is, I think, intuitively obvious that the prior wishes of the
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deceased are morally relevant to certain treatments of human
remains: it is somehow wrong to put Chinese prisoners’ bodies
on display without consent, or perhaps to bury someone who
wanted to be cremated. But it is less clear why that should be so.
How is the non-consensual display of cadavers, or burying
someone who wanted to be cremated, wrongful? The deceased
presumably has no awareness of her present condition or any
capacity to be affected by it; and, it, therefore, is not obvious that
she can be harmed.10 In addition, if we assume that the Chinese
prisoners or the people whose fate it was to be buried never had
any inkling that this was what was in store for their remains, the
fact of their display or burial had no effect on them while they
were alive.
B. LEGAL RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS REGARDING TREATMENT OF
THEIR CORPSES

C M
Y K
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10. There is actually philosophical controversy over whether the dead can be
harmed. This possibility will be discussed in detail in continuing parts.
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There are at least three reasons why lawmakers would
recognize a legal right of individuals to make decisions about
the treatment of their own corpses. First, we may think that the
dead have an ongoing interest in the integrity of their dead
bodies. Living individuals have an interest in their bodily
integrity that grounds rights against interference without
consent. We may conceive of this interest in bodily integrity as
surviving death, such that to contravene people’s prior wishes is
to harm the dead. The theory that the dead have interests that
can ground rights is controversial, but it may be the easiest to
reconcile with some laws granting rights to make decisions
about one’s future cadaver.
Second, we may grant the ability to make decisions about
the treatment of one’s own corpse because living people care
about what happens to their bodies after death and we want to
give them confidence that their wishes will be respected after
death. On this view, the dead need not have rights. The reason
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This article, therefore, considers two potential interestholders: the living individual in relation to her own future
cadaver, and the deceased “individual” (for lack of a better
term) in relation to her (present) cadaver. It then addresses the
implications of whose interests the law aims to protect when it
grants individuals the right to make binding decisions about the
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for respecting people’s wishes, even after they are dead, is to
give comfort to the living. This is uncontroversial: we want to
give the living confidence that their wishes will be respected,
regardless of whether we also view the dead as having interests
and rights in their own right.
Third, we may protect an interest in posthumous bodily
integrity because, as a society, we wish to see ourselves as
people who respect the wishes of the dead. This could be
because we believe the dead have moral interests and we want
to act morally by respecting those interests, or because we think
the living will benefit if we respect the prior wishes of the dead.
It could be because we promise people that we will respect their
wishes, and we want to be a society that keeps our promises. It
could also be because we perceive that respecting the wishes of
the dead honors the lives of those who have died. The reasons
need not be determined: what matters on this approach is that
the importance of an interest in posthumous bodily integrity
derives, at least in part, from the fact that we as a society want to
see ourselves in a certain light: it is society that benefits by
respecting the wishes of the dead.
The focus of this article is the first two reasons for
protecting posthumous bodily integrity. The third is largely
ignored, just as other competing interests in the treatment of
corpses (those of potential organ recipients, for example, or of
the families of the deceased) are largely ignored. The aim of the
article is to examine the implications of whether the dead have
an interest in posthumous bodily integrity, or whether the
interest in bodily integrity is extinguished by death.
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11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965).
12. A poignant example can be found in Drew Gilpin Faust’s excellent book on
death in the Civil War. One soldier worried: “It is dreadful to contemplate being
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treatment of their corpse. This is not to deny that others have an
interest in the treatment of a corpse: surviving family and
potential organ recipients are just two examples. However, the
question at issue is: what follows from a view that the dead do,
or do not, have an ongoing interest in their posthumous bodily
integrity?
While alive, we all have an interest in bodily integrity that is
protected by law.
For example, the law prohibits nonconsensual touching: any physical interference without consent
is potentially criminal assault and tortious battery.11 The laws
that protect a person’s interest in bodily integrity grant legal
rights to living individuals. That is, perhaps obviously, the
rights-holder is the individual whose body is at stake. As with
the treatment of dead bodies, other individuals and society, in
general, may have an interest in the treatment of other peoples’
living bodies. For example, society as a whole has an interest in
ensuring that living human bodies are treated with dignity. As a
result, some interferences cannot legally be consented to, such as
serious bodily harm. The existence of competing interests does
not negate the fact that individuals have an interest in what
happens to their own bodies and that this interest is, to varying
degrees, protected by law.
That one’s interest in one’s body, and related legal
protection of the interest, should also extend to one’s dead body
is not obvious. Yet few interferences with a corpse, other than
some kind of dignified disposal, are permitted without consent –
either the prior consent of the deceased or substitute consent of
the next of kin. This is perhaps not so surprising when we
consider how much many people care about what happens to
their bodies after they die. Many care deeply about whether
their bodies are buried or cremated, the subject of medical
research, or treated with dignity, and whether their organs are
removed for transplant.12
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killed on the field of battle without a kind hand to hide one’s remains from the eye
of the world or the gnawing of animals and buzzards.” D REW GILPIN FAUST, THIS
REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 63 (2008).
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In granting individuals the right to decide what happens to
their bodies after their death, the law creates rights-holders in
relation to those bodies. This may seem obvious – even
tautologous – but a question arises how to characterize the
holder of this legal right. There are at least two ways of
conceiving of these rights-holders. First, they are only living
individuals whose bodies will become the corpses at issue. At
the moment of death, that person’s legal right to posthumous
bodily integrity would cease because there is no longer any
entity with moral status to possess that particular right. This
does not mean that the law could not still be enforced, but
enforcement would only serve the function of giving confidence
to other living individuals that their own wishes will be carried
out. There would be no legal obligation to the deceased on the
basis of a right to posthumous bodily integrity.
Alternately, the legal right to posthumous bodily integrity
could belong to dead “individuals” themselves: in other words,
people’s right to posthumous bodily integrity could survive
death. Several scholars consider the dead to be capable of
having moral status and of possessing legal rights, and the
article considers the basis on which the dead could be
considered to have an interest in posthumous bodily integrity
and what implications would follow for the law if they had such
an interest.
Whether a right to posthumous bodily integrity belongs to
the living individual only or survives death may seem a rather
fine, and perhaps irrelevant distinction: the relevant laws apply
regardless.
However, in analyzing these laws from the
perspective of the different potential rights-bearer, three types of
insight emerge. First, the reasons for having laws protecting
posthumous bodily integrity are different depending on who the
rights-bearers are. Second, to the extent that some laws are more
consistent with an approach that views the dead as rights-
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holders versus only the living (or vice versa), this may help
elucidate whose interests lawmakers are trying to protect.
Third, if one has a view about whether the dead are capable of
having rights, this will have implications for how one thinks
laws protecting posthumous bodily integrity should be
structured.
The article’s approach is largely positive rather than
normative. Although it is my own view that the dead are not
capable of being rights-bearers, the article’s primary goal is not
to defend that position but rather to explore the consequences of
whether they are, or not. In addition, this is not an article about
balancing competing rights or interests in the bodies of the dead.
It is not concerned, for example, with whether individuals
should be allowed to decline to be organ donors or whether
displays of plastinated corpses should be banned on the basis
that they are undignified. Although the interest in, and legal
right to, posthumous bodily integrity are central to this article,
this should in no way be interpreted as suggesting that
individuals’ wishes regarding their corpses should always be
respected – either as a moral or a legal matter.
D. PURPOSE AND DIRECTION OF THIS ARTICLE
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The article is structured as follows. Part II introduces the
ways in which someone could have an interest in the treatment
of her corpse. As noted above, interests can be conceived of as
terminating on an individual’s death or as surviving death. Part
II explores the philosophical basis on which living individuals
can be conceived of as having legal rights in relation to things
that happen after their deaths, as well as the basis on which the
dead can be conceived of as having legal rights.
Part III examines the moral implications for an interest in
posthumous bodily integrity when the interest belongs to the
dead or only to the living. Specifically, it considers the
difference the identity of the interest-bearer makes when the
individual’s prior wishes were express, inferable, or unknown.
For example, if only the living have a right to posthumous
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bodily integrity, and enforcement after death simply serves to
give confidence to other living individuals that their own wishes
will be carried out, it is easier to justify a policy that treats the
corpses of those whose wishes are unknowable differently than
those of deceased people whose prior wishes were known.
Part IV examines specific laws that grant a right to
posthumous bodily integrity. In particular, it discusses laws in
relation to posthumous organ donation, medical education and
research using cadavers, the requirement of consent for
posthumous reproduction, the ability to refuse an autopsy, and
the ability to choose burial versus cremation. After
demonstrating that these laws grant a right to posthumous
bodily integrity, the analysis in Part IV reveals that it matters
who holds the rights. Specifically, the weight to be given to
competing interests often should depend in part on whether the
dead have an interest in posthumous bodily integrity. This is
not a question that appears to have been considered in drafting
or enacting legislation, and I suggest a change to anatomical gift
legislation that reflects my own view that the dead cannot have
rights. If, however, the dead can have a right to posthumous
bodily integrity, laws permitting the display of ancient corpses
are harder to justify.

A. INTRODUCTION AND TERMINOLOGY

C M
Y K
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To set the stage for an analysis of a legal right to
posthumous bodily integrity, it is important to consider on what
basis there can be rights in relation to dead people’s bodies.
There is no question that the general public and living family
members can have legal rights in relation to others’ cadavers
because they are living people with ongoing interests in the
treatment of those cadavers. (Assume for the moment that
interests ground rights, which will be addressed below.) Less
obvious is how a person can have an interest in the treatment of
her own cadaver. After all, the person and the cadaver will
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II. POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS
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never coexist, such that it is not obvious why a person has an
interest in the treatment of her corpse – either before or after her
death. The argument might go that I should not have a present
interest in what happens after my death because I will not be
around to be affected by those events, and after I am dead I will
not have an interest in anything because there will not be a “me”
to have interests at all.
That said, there are two ways in which such postmortem
interests can be justified: first, living people are said to have an
interest in certain events that occur after their deaths because
they may be part of a person’s overall life plan; and second,
some construe the dead themselves as having a limited set of
ongoing interests. While the first justification is relatively
uncontroversial, the second is not. Some deny that the dead
have sufficient moral status to possess a legal right to
posthumous bodily integrity and, therefore, should not be
viewed as having that right. From this view it follows that the
previous wishes of the dead can be ignored without violating
any rights of the dead themselves. However, respecting the
wishes of the dead may be desirable insofar as it gives
confidence to the living that their own wishes will be carried out
(or for other reasons related to fulfilling the interests of
surviving family or society as a whole).
It is important to be clear that the relevant question is not
one of legal standing or enforcement of the law – the dead have
no legal standing – but another legal entity, such as the
deceased’s estate, could conceivably seek to enforce a right to
posthumous bodily integrity. For example, one could imagine
the estate of a deceased person suing to prevent certain medical
research on a corpse based on the provisions of a deceased’s
will. Rather, at issue is the nature of legally-protected interests
in the treatment of one’s corpse.
In addition, it is worth noting that the fact that corpses are
legally protected does not mean that corpses have legal rights
any more than the fact that heritage buildings are legally
protected means that those buildings have legal rights. Whose
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rights a law protects is a question of who is its subject rather
than its object; “for whom” the law is enacted rather than “in
regard to” what.13 The fact that corpses are legally protected is
therefore not determinative of whether only the living are rightsholders.
The question addressed below is what implications flow
from the view that the law treats the dead as rights-holders
versus the view that it only treats the living as rights-holders.
Again, the article is not primarily attempting to answer the
controversial philosophical question whether the dead are
capable of being rights-holders. Rather, it focuses on the
implications for the law given both approaches.
B. AN INTERESTS-BASED APPROACH TO RIGHTS
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Y K
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13. Matthew H. Kramer, Do Animals and Dead People Have Legal Rights?, 14
CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 29, 39 (2001).
14. Kirsten Smolensky makes the same point in her own work. See Kirsten
Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 769–72 (2009).
15. See Leif Wenar, Rights, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Fall
2011 ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/rights/ (last reviewed
Jul. 2, 2011) (outlining a general discussion of Hart’s Will Theory). See also Kramer,
supra note 13, at 29.
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Rights are notoriously difficult to define and are
conceptualized differently by different scholars. The various
approaches, including Hohfeld’s, Hart’s Will Theory (also
known as Choice Theory), and interest-based theories are
discussed at length in the jurisprudence literature and this
article will only address interests-based theories in any detail.
What is important to note is that some of these theories are
less easily reconciled with the view that the dead are capable of
having rights.14 Hart’s Will Theory, for example, requires that
rights-holders have the ability to make reasoned decisions,15
which would obviously be problematic for the claim that the
dead can be rights-bearers and would also potentially rule out as
rights-holders some of the living, such as those in a persistent
vegetative state. Other theories, however, view non-humans,
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16. See, e.g., generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?
(1996).
17. George W. Rainbolt, Rights Theory, 1 PHIL. COMPASS 11, 11 (2006).
18. DANIEL SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL
PERSPECTIVES 71 (2008).
19. For now, I deliberately avoid suggesting that only persons may hold
interests, since the subject of this inquiry is whether the dead can be interestholders.
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animals, and even trees as potential rights-bearers.16 Thus,
depending on one’s view of the nature and scope of rights, it
may, or may not, be possible for the dead to have them. Since
the aim of this article is not primarily to take a normative
position as to whether the dead have rights but rather to
examine what it might mean if they do or do not, I take an
approach to rights that is compatible with the dead being rightsbearers, namely an interests-based approach.
Just as there is no agreement as to the best approach to
rights, even within an interests-based approach there is no
agreement as to the precise role of interests in relation to legal
rights. What interest theories of rights have in common is the
view that an entity has a right when others have a duty to
protect one of its interests.17 Thus, “legal rules conferring rights
promote the right-holder’s well-being represented by her legal
interests.”18 Interest theories have been promoted by scholars
such as Bentham, Raz, Feinberg, and Kramer.
“Interests” refer to those moral claims of an entity,19 the
violation of which is a moral wrong, all things being equal.
Some interests are more deserving of, and may receive more
legal protection, than others. There should be overlap between
interests and legal protections (for example, to deliberately
injure a person both violates that person’s interest in bodily
integrity and is contrary to the law), but the overlap will never
be absolute for several reasons, including the fact that interests
are neither universally agreed upon nor static. In addition,
interests often conflict, such that it is impossible to respect
everyone’s interests simultaneously. Balancing interests is
therefore important in lawmaking.
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20. Joel Feinberg, The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in RIGHTS,
JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 165, 167 (1980) [hereinafter Feinberg Rights]
(outlining the interests principle).
21. Joel Feinberg, Harm and Self-Interest, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS
OF LIBERTY 45, 45 (1980) [hereinafter Feinberg Harm].
22. Id. at 46.
23. Feinberg Rights, supra note 20, at 168.
24. Kramer, supra note 13, at 33.
25. Id.
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Consider two different interests-based approaches to rights.
Joel Feinberg’s theory is that in order to be capable of having
legal rights one must be capable of having interests.20 For him,
to have an interest means to have a stake in something.21
Interests are related to, but narrower than, wants and desires, in
that only deep-rooted wants can be interests.22 As a result,
having an interest presupposes having “rudimentary cognitive
equipment.”23
Matthew Kramer’s approach is broader. According to him,
any entity that can benefit, in a general sense, can have interests.
X has an interest in an event or state of affairs if that “event or
state of affairs will improve X’s condition or will avert a
deterioration therein.”24 Unlike Feinberg’s approach, Kramer’s
does not require that interest-holders have rudimentary
cognitive equipment. Therefore, inanimate objects, such as
buildings, can have interests.
However, the difference between Feinberg and Kramer’s
approaches is less than it appears, because whereas Feinberg’s
interest-holders are capable of being rights holders, only a
subset of Kramer’s interest-holders is capable of having rights.
Thus, even though many more entities count as interest-holders
in Kramer’s approach than in Feinberg’s, many of Kramer’s
interest-holders are not rights-holders.
According to Kramer, possessing interests is a necessary but
insufficient condition for an entity to have the status of a legal
rights-holder. The moral status of the entity must be considered,
and Kramer evaluates the moral status of entities in comparison
to entities with paradigmatic moral status – namely competent
adult humans.25 Feinberg takes moral status into consideration
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in determining who is an interests-holder, and considers
interest-holders to be potential rights-holders, while Kramer
considers moral status only after status as an interest-holder has
been established.
Kramer provides the example of a law that forbids walking
on the grass.26 According to him, the lawn and perhaps each
blade of grass have interests, but they do not have legal rights.
Rather, the holder of rights in the context of this law is the public
for whose benefit the law is maintained.27 The grass does not
have legal rights because it is too dissimilar to living people.
According to Kramer, a rights-holder is someone for whose
benefit a law is enacted and it does not make sense to think that
a law forbidding walking on the grass is enacted for the grass’
benefit.28 Feinberg’s approach to the same example would
presumably be that grass does not have interests, because it
doesn’t have a stake in whether it is trampled or even in whether
it lives or dies, and therefore the grass cannot have rights.
According to him, legal rights are a kind of claim against
someone and only those with interests can have such claims.29
Kramer’s approach can be criticized for taking too broad a
view of interests. If “interest” is to have any moral significance,
then inanimate objects should not be viewed as having interests
simply because they can be improved or destroyed. Such an
approach grants some kind of moral status to almost every
tangible thing, although not necessarily very much moral status
and not necessarily the capacity to bear legal rights. On the
other hand, Kramer may not intend for interests to have any
inherent moral significance: the question of moral significance
may only arise at the stage of determining whether someone (or
something) is a rights-holder.
Neither of these interests-based approaches to rights
requires the ability to enforce those rights oneself. Nor does the
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nature of what is protected dictate who the rights-holder is: a
law can protect something without that something being the
rights-holder, as is the case with lawns and heritage buildings in
the examples above. Note also that just because an entity is
capable of having legal rights does not mean that all laws in
relation to it necessarily protect its own interests. For example,
we can proscribe indignities to a corpse not only to protect the
deceased’s own interests (assuming for the moment that it can
have interests), but to protect the public’s interest in the
dignified treatment of the dead.
To summarize, according to interest theories of rights,
having interests is the basis for having legal rights (although
having interests may not be a sufficient condition for having
legal rights) and competent human adults are paradigmatic
rights-holders. The latter is presumably true of all theories of
rights, but it is an important aspect of Kramer’s approach to
creating rights from interests.
C. INTERESTS OF THE LIVING IN THE TREATMENT OF THEIR
CORPSE

C M
Y K
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30. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 201–02 (1993).
31. Id. at 201.
32. Id. at 224.
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Given an interests-based approach to rights, living
individuals can have an interest in what happens to their bodies
after they die, even though those people will no longer exist at
the relevant time. The interests of the living in what will become
their corpse are what Dworkin calls critical interests.30 He draws
a distinction between critical and experiential interests:
experiential interests are those that relate to experience and state
of mind, while critical interests reflect critical judgments about
what makes life good.31 The ability to shape our lives according
to our critical and experiential interests, according to Dworkin,
is central to the value of autonomy.32 Decisions about our living
bodies may reflect experiential interests (for example, the desire
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34. Id. at 163.
35. T. M. Wilkinson, Individual and Family Decisions About Organ Donation, 24 J.
APPLIED PHIL. 26, 31 (2007).
36. ROBERT M. VEATCH, TRANSPLANTATION ETHICS 146 (2000).
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to avoid pain) or critical interests (a religious interest in not
having a medical procedure).
The living can have no
experiential interests in relation to post-death events, since death
and experience are mutually exclusive. However, they may
have critical interests in relation to such events.
For example, Donald can have a critical interest in ensuring
that his family is financially secure during his lifetime but also
after he is dead. He may also have a critical interest in
preserving the environment for future generations.
Philosophical theorists Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock draw a
distinction, similar to Dworkin’s, between experiential interests
and “surviving interests,” which are essentially those critical
interests that relate to future events.33 They conclude that such
interests may relate to post-death events.34 Thus, “[w]hat
happens after death can (depending on the particular person’s
own idea of self-development) complete the development of the
self.”35
The existence of critical interests in relation to post-mortem
events means not only that people care what happens after they
die, but also that they have a moral claim to determining what
happens after they die. Since critical interests implicate our
autonomy – our interest in making decisions about ourselves –
we can have a present interest in post-mortem events.36 These
post-mortem events can include the treatment of our bodies after
death. However, the fact that we have a moral claim does not
mean that that claim must always be respected or that it must be
legally protected. One’s interest in autonomy is not absolute.
When it comes to organ donation, for example, other entities
with an interest in the treatment of a corpse include the
surviving family, potential organ recipients and their families,
and society at large (which has a stake in promoting health and
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37. Those who take the view that the dead have interests may object to the
assertion that a person’s critical interests cannot be harmed after death. This
possibility will be discussed in the following parts. For now, the assertion can be
read as meaning that a living person’s critical interests cannot be harmed after
death because the living person no longer exists. Whether the dead person assumes
those interests is, for now, an open question.
38. See generally Elinor Mason, We Make No Promises, 123 PHIL. STUD. 33
(2005), for a discussion of the morality of breaking promises, including deathbed
promises.
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in minimizing healthcare costs).
Living individuals can therefore have critical interests in the
treatment of their corpses. These interests can ground legal
rights. What is less clear is whether those interests survive
death, such that the dead themselves can be construed as having
an interest in their posthumous bodily integrity. If so, then all
things being equal, we should carry out the wishes of the dead,
in part, because doing so respects interests that persist. But
assuming for the moment that the only potential interest an
individual could have in her own corpse is the critical interest of
the living individual in her future cadaver, that interest would
end with the individual’s death. It would follow that there is no
moral obligation to the deceased to actually carry out an
individual’s wishes after her death. Rather, any interest a
person had in the treatment of her corpse could only be fulfilled
or violated during her life: individuals’ moral claims in relation
to their bodies would expire at death.
Notwithstanding the inability to harm a person’s critical
interests after her death,37 there may be reasons for respecting
the prior wishes of the dead even if only the living have
interests. If people’s wishes are not actually respected after
death, two things follow. First, if a person or the state assures
another that her body will be treated in a particular way to break
that promise is immoral, even though it is not a violation of the
deceased’s interests.38 It is a wrong, but not a wrong to the
deceased. (For present purposes I ignore any distinction
between the morality of an individual breaking a promise versus
a state breaking a promise.)
Second, if an individual’s post-mortem wishes are not
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systematically respected, living individuals will have good
reason to doubt that their own wishes will be respected after
their death. Their critical interests in the treatment of their
corpses can therefore not be satisfied. Thus, the claim that living
individuals have an interest in what happens to their corpses
rests not on interests that survive death, but rather on the benefit
to them of knowing, while they are alive, that their wishes will
be respected.
A living person’s legal right to posthumous bodily integrity
can therefore be grounded in a critical interest, while alive, in the
treatment of her corpse. We care about our corpses because they
are closely linked to our living bodies, which are central to our
concepts of ourselves and to our autonomy while alive.
D. INTERESTS OF THE DEAD IN THE TREATMENT OF THEIR
CORPSE

C M
Y K
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39. See David L. Perry, Ethics and Personhood: Some Issues in Contemporary
Neurological
Science
and
Technology,
SANTA
CLARA
UNIVERSITY,
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/submitted/Perry/personhood.html
(last
visited May 23, 2013). Perry’s lecture, found on the Santa Clara webpage, also
discusses the experience problem.
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The argument above that the living have critical interests in
the treatment of their future corpse is relatively uncontroversial.
Much more controversial is the issue of whether those interests
can survive death. Phrased differently, the question is whether
the dead themselves can have interests or rights in the treatment
of their bodies. The possibility that the dead have interests
raises two problems, known as the “experience problem” and
the “problem of the subject.”
The experience problem is essentially that because the dead
have no self-awareness or ability to experience anything, they
cannot be harmed, they cannot have a stake in anything, and
their interests while alive can no longer be thwarted.39 (“Harm”
is used here to mean to set back or not fulfill one’s interests; and,
the fact that different theorists have different conceptions of
what counts as an interest should not affect the analysis.) In
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40. See generally L. W. SUMNER, WELFARE, HAPPINESS AND ETHICS (1996).
Sumner’s account is one of welfare rather than harm, but since interests are defined
in terms of welfare and harm is defined in terms of interests, this poses no problem.
Sumner is of the view that we are not harmed when our desires are thwarted unless
we have awareness of the fact. See id. at 113–37.
41. Ernest Partridge, Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect, 91 ETHICS
243, 247 (1981).
42. And even that is controversial. Some maintain that what is good for us can
be at least partially determined on an objective basis. See SUMNER, supra note 40, at
45–80.
43. See, e.g., Feinberg Harm, supra note 21, at 61, 63.

33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 40 Side A

essence, the argument is that the dead no longer have interests
because of their inability to be harmed. However, this assumes a
subjective approach to harm that is itself controversial. It
assumes that awareness by the subject of harm is a necessary
condition for harm: one is only harmed if one knows about the
harmful event or fact. If Donald has an interest in the financial
wellbeing of his children, for example, on a subjective approach
to harm it is not sufficient that Donald’s children are all poor for
him to be harmed – he must know that they’re poor. A number
of scholars, such as L. W. Sumner, take a subjective approach to
harm.40 Others are willing to concede an objective approach to
interests even if they do not ultimately believe the dead can have
interests.41
Thus, on a subjective approach, it is difficult to conceive of
the dead as having posthumous legal rights. If harm to an
interest requires the harm to be experienced, and the dead are
incapable of experiencing anything, it follows that the dead are
incapable of having their interests harmed. If there is no
prospect for the violation of an interest, there would seem to be
no foundation for a legal right to have that interest protected
within an interest-based theory of rights.
Some scholars, however, consider harm to be at least
partially objective. Although one’s interests, themselves, are
subjectively determined (by virtue of what specific individuals
value),42 whether or not those interests have been thwarted (in
other words, whether one has been harmed) can be determined
objectively.43 On such an approach, Donald is harmed if he has
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Id. at 65–68.
Id. at 64.
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an interest in his children’s financial well-being, and his children
are poor, regardless of whether Donald knows they are poor.
Feinberg’s approach to harm is objective.44 He claims that
we are harmed when our interests are thwarted, regardless of
whether we are aware of the harm. For example, Feinberg
considers libeled people to be harmed even if they are never
made aware of the harm to their reputations. An individual is
harmed if she is the owner of a harmed interest regardless of
whether she feels harmed.45
Whereas the subjective approach to the experience problem
made it difficult to conceive of the dead having posthumous
interests and therefore posthumous rights, such rights are
clearly possible on an objective approach: by eliminating the
need for harm to be experienced you eliminate the experience
problem. Feinberg concludes that our interests can survive
death, in part, because they are objective.
The second and more difficult problem for any theory in
which the dead have interests is the problem of the subject. If
the deceased person no longer exists, and her interests are
thwarted, we can reasonably ask whose interests have been
thwarted. Who has been harmed by events that take place after
death? There are several possible approaches to the problem of
the subject. One, once held by Feinberg but later rejected by
him, is to say that what is harmed is the interest itself, not the
person whose interest it is.46 This is, essentially, to reject the
need for a subject at all. The interest can continue to exist when
the person no longer does: “[w]hen death thwarts an interest,
the interest is harmed, and the harm can be ascribed to the man
who is no more, just as his debts can be charged to his estate.”47
Thus, the dead can have rights by virtue of the fact that interests
exist independent of that of the person whose interests they
are/were. Further, those interests can ground rights of the
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48. See George Pitcher, The Misfortunes of the Dead, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 183, 184
(1984).
49. Id.
50. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 91 (1984).
51. Joan C. Callahan, On Harming the Dead, 97 ETHICS 341, 345–46 (1987). For
more arguments against the dead having interests, see generally Malin Masterton et
al., Queen Christina’s Moral Claim on the Living: Justification of a Tenacious Moral
Intuition, 10 MED., HEALTHCARE & PHIL. 321 (2007).
52. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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deceased because of the connection between the interest and the
person that was.
Feinberg later rejected this view, however, in favor of the
ante-mortem person approach, which is similar to George
Pitcher’s view of posthumous interests. On the ante-mortem
person view, the dead retain an interest in those things that
relate to the important desires that were held by those people
before they died – the ante-mortem people.48 The dead can be
harmed if those desires are thwarted after death. Pitcher
distinguishes between the post-mortem dead – the mere dust
that cannot be harmed – and the dead as reflecting the antemortem persons that they were.49
Scholars have criticized theories of posthumous interests
based on the ante-mortem person and her interests. In order to
avoid retroactivity (the person being harmed before the harmful
event actually occurs), Feinberg and Pitcher’s approach to
posthumous interests relies on the posthumous harm having
been a harm all along – the fact that the harm will eventually
occur means that all along the individual was playing a “losing
Joan Callaghan views this approach as simply
game.”50
bolstering the argument that the dead can have no interests.
According to her, what Feinberg and Pitcher are essentially
arguing is that the living can be harmed by the fact that their
wishes will not be fulfilled after death.51
Another approach to the problem of the subject is that of
Kramer. Recall that Feinberg required interests-bearers to have
some kind of cognitive equipment, and so any theory of his in
relation to posthumous interests would have to address that
issue.52 Feinberg did so by relying on ante-mortem people who
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had cognitive capacity. Kramer’s approach, on the other hand,
does not require subjects to have cognitive capacity in order to
have interests.53 Rather, subjects must merely have the capacity
to be affected (without necessarily having awareness or
experience of the effect) to have interests. On his view buildings
and grass can have interests and so, clearly, can the dead.
However, having interests isn’t sufficient to ground rights
on Kramer’s view, so whether the dead can have posthumous
rights depends on the moral significance of their interests. That,
in turn, is based on the morally relevant resemblance between
the subject and competent adult humans.54 In his article Do
Animals and Dead People Have Legal Rights, Kramer concludes that
the dead can have legal rights if we “subsume the aftermath of
each dead person’s life within the overall course of his or her
existence”.55 If we consider the ways in which the dead continue
to influence the living – through their possessions and their
persistence in people’s memories, for example – we can conceive
of them as still having an existence, and therefore as being
sufficiently analogous to competent adult humans and capable
of having rights. On this view, the subject of posthumous
interests is the dead, but only insofar as the dead have continued
existence in the lives of living people.
The nature of the subject of posthumous interests has
significant implications for the scope and nature of those
interests and the resulting rights. One thing that seems to follow
from all approaches to the subject of posthumous interests is that
those interests are a subset of the interests held by the living
person before her death. I am aware of no theory that grants
interests to the deceased based on factors other than the interests
of the living individuals they used to be. However, no theory
holds that a deceased’s posthumous interests are identical to the
interests the living person held while alive. For example, no one
contests that experiential interests, such as the interest in

07/02/2013 13:56:24

53. See discussion supra Part II.B.
54. Kramer, supra note 13, at 32, 35.
55. Id. at 47.
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avoiding pain, are extinguished by death.
Although theories of posthumous interests have in common
the fact that posthumous interests are a subset of the former
living person’s interests, the scope of posthumous interests
varies. Consider, for example, whether a particular interest of a
living person needs to be communicated to others in order for it
to survive as a posthumous interest. On the ante-mortem person
approach advocated by Pitcher and Feinberg, there is no reason
to think an interest must be communicated to survive. Since the
subject of posthumous interests is the ante-mortem person, the
relevant interests are those of the ante-mortem person. There is
no need to tie the subject of posthumous interests to people’s
recollection of that person. Thus, there is no reason to think that
one’s interests had to have been communicated before death in
order for the relevant posthumous interests to exist any more
than an incompetent patient’s desires before incompetence have
to be expressed in order for the patient to retain an interest in
treatment that reflects those wishes. Rather, as long as the
interest is still capable of being fulfilled or thwarted, it persists.56
Kirsten Smolensky, on the other hand, who takes Kramer’s
approach to posthumous interests, limits posthumous interests
to those that the deceased expressed to others before her death.57
According to Smolensky, whether an interest survives death
depends on whether there is a record of the desire underlying
the interest.58 As a result, a secret desire reflects an interest that
dies with the person who held it.
Smolensky’s requirement that the living know about an
interest of the deceased for it to survive follows from Kramer’s
view that the dead continue to be rights-bearers only to the
extent that they live on in the memories of the living.59 If this is
so, then an individual’s desires unknown to others cannot
survive death to become posthumous interests. It would also
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III. MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF WHETHER AN INTEREST IN
POSTHUMOUS BODILY INTEGRITY BELONGS TO THE DEAD
OR ONLY TO THE LIVING

C M
Y K
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This Part examines the moral implications of viewing a right to
posthumous bodily integrity as belonging either only to living
individuals in relation to their own bodies or also to the dead.
Specifically, it considers the implication in three scenarios in
which a claim to posthumous bodily integrity could arise: a)
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follow that those who had no friends, family, possessions,
acquaintances, or celebrity would have no posthumous interests
and that those who were more guarded and private may have
fewer posthumous interests than those who were less so.
Whether posthumous interests exist only in relation to
expressed desires will have implications for whether the dead
can have an interest in certain treatment of their corpse in the
absence of expressed wishes. For example, as will become more
apparent below, the issue has implications for whether, under
existing law, we should presume consent to organ donation
where the wishes of the living person are unknown.
Having examined the problem of experience and the
problem of the subject, there is no agreement as to whether the
dead can have interests or be rights-holders. Even if we accept
that the dead can have rights, the scope of those rights is the
subject of debate. My own view is that harm is subjective and in
any event one must have the capacity to be affected (not just
altered) in order to be the proper subject of rights. In my view,
an important feature of death is that it precludes any further
harm or benefit to the deceased. However, my aim is not to
convince the reader of the correctness of my view: the debate on
whether the dead can have interests that ground rights has been
discussed for decades in the literature and I make no new
arguments to add in defense of my view that they cannot. What
is important for present purposes is to recognize that there are
multiple approaches to whether, and how, the dead can be
conceived of as rights-bearers.
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where an individual’s wishes regarding her corpse were
expressed before her death; b) where her wishes were not
expressed but can be inferred; and c) where her wishes are
neither expressed nor inferable. For the moment the analysis
assumes a generic right to posthumous bodily integrity,
although this should be viewed as a placeholder for the sum of
legally-granted rights to make specific decisions about the
treatment of one’s dead body. These specific interests will be
examined in the next Part. The analysis reveals that the moral
basis for a right to bodily integrity varies considerably
depending on whether the underlying interests are construed as
surviving death or not. And in some cases, the different
approaches suggest different morally-acceptable conduct in
relation to dead bodies.
A. PRIOR WISHES EXPLICITLY EXPRESSED
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60. See discussion supra Parts II.B. & D.
61. See id.
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Assume an individual, Sara, made it known that she wished
to be cremated and not to be an organ donor. Assume also that
these were her sincere wishes and that Sara is a competent adult.
Regardless of whether Sara’s critical interests in not being an
organ donor and in being cremated survive her death, the moral
thing to do appears to be to respect those wishes, but the reasons
for this differ considerably depending on whose interests are at
stake. If these interests of Sara’s survive death, then to fail to
abide by them is to harm the deceased Sara’s critical interests.
To be more precise, those critical interests survive on both a
Feinberg and Kramer-style approach to posthumous interests.
On Feinberg’s account, interests need not be known to others in
order to survive.60 On Kramer’s account, they do need to be
known to others,61 but this section assumes that Sara’s wishes
have, in fact, been explicitly communicated.
If, however, Sara’s interests cease to exist when she dies,
any morality-based reasons for respecting Sara’s wishes depend
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62. See generally Mason, supra note 38 (discussing four philosophical views on
the implications and act of promising).
63. The issue is somewhat more complicated in that it depends whether one
takes a subjective or objective approach to interests. On Feinberg’s view, whether
one thinks one’s interest is fulfilled or thwarted is irrelevant to whether that interest
is actually fulfilled. To avoid this problem, it is sufficient to recognize that the
living have not only an interest in the treatment of their corpse, but an interest in
believing their corpse will be treated in a certain way. People can, certainly, suffer
from the belief that their posthumous wishes will not be respected, even if they
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on the existence of promises or the knowledge of others that her
wishes were not respected.
If Sara’s wishes were expressed in a legally binding manner,
the state has given Sara reason to believe that her wishes will be
respected. This amounts to a kind of promise by the state,
although equating laws with state promises is perhaps too
simplistic. The idea of state promises is also subject to the caveat
that some laws grant only negative rights. For example, there is
no positive right to be an organ donor – the state never promises
that one’s consent will result in donation – but there is a right
not to be an organ donor.
If Sara’s wishes were not expressed in a legally binding
manner but were nevertheless explicit, the surviving family may
have explicitly or implicitly promised Sara that they would
ensure her wishes would be carried out. If so, and her wishes
are ultimately not respected, this amounts to a broken promise
by the family. From the perspective of broken promises, it may
be immoral to ignore Sara’s wishes if a promise was made to
respect them. This is true regardless of whether Sara’s interests
survive death. Assuming that breaking promises is wrong even
if it does not harm the person to whom the promise was made,62
it is not necessary for Sara to still have interests in order for a
broken promise to her to be immoral.
There is another perspective from which it may be immoral
to ignore Sara’s express wishes, but it only applies in relation to
the interests of living individuals in the treatment of their own
corpses. Since a living person can have critical interests in the
treatment of her corpse, those interests can only be fulfilled
during life if the person believes her wishes will be respected.63
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Thus, by systematically ignoring people’s wishes regarding their
corpses, the living will have no comfort that their own wishes
will be respected.
There is, therefore, an interesting distinction between the
living and the dead as interest-holders in this respect. Not
following Sara’s prior wishes regarding a critical posthumous
interest harms the dead Sara if, indeed, the dead Sara can have
interests. However, if the dead Sara has no interests, not
following her wishes does not harm her. The failure to abide by
her wishes can only constitute harm insofar as it amounts to a
broken promise or causes other living people to doubt that their
own wishes will be respected. One implication of this is that if
no one knows Sara’s wishes were not respected, and her
interests terminate at death, it may be morally unproblematic
not to respect her express wishes unless a promise to her was
broken. Thus, if Sara mentioned to her children that she did not
want to be an organ donor, but she never expressed those
wishes in a legally binding manner, her children did not
explicitly or implicitly promise their mother they would carry
out her wishes, and no one else knows what Sara wanted, there
may be no moral obligation to fulfill Sara’s wishes.
That said, there might be a broader dignitary interest in
carrying out the wishes of the dead. That is, there may be
dignitary harm to society as a whole in not respecting the prior
wishes of the dead even if the fact of not respecting those wishes
is never made public and no promises were made. This relates
to the possibility mentioned in the introduction that society has
an interest in seeing itself in a certain light – as people who
respect the wishes of the dead. Thus, it may be morally wrong
not to respect the express wishes of the dead, regardless of
promises and the public’s knowledge, if society is harmed by
acts of refusing to honor the wishes of the dead. However, the
reasons why society would be harmed by such acts depend on
why society thinks it important to respect the wishes of the dead
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in the first place. These reasons could include wanting to give
confidence to the living that their wishes will be respected (in
which case the refusal would have to be public knowledge to
affect the interest), believing that the dead have ongoing
interests (in which case the refusal would not have to be public
knowledge to affect the interest), wanting to show respect for
the person that was, or for any number of other reasons.
However, since this article is primarily concerned with the
interests of living and dead individuals in relation to their own
bodies rather than societal interests in the treatment of corpses, it
does not pursue further the nature of society’s interests in the
treatment of the dead.
B. PRIOR WISHES NOT EXPLICITLY EXPRESSED BUT PERHAPS
INFERABLE

07/02/2013 13:56:24
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This section considers the implications of the identity of the
rights-holder for situations in which the deceased did not
explicitly make her wishes known, but where there are
surviving friends and family who knew the deceased, or there
are known facts about the deceased that could lead to inferences
about what her wishes would have been.
Imagine that Sara left no explicit instructions but has
surviving friends and family, or she has known affiliations, such
as a religious affiliation, from which wishes regarding the
treatment of her corpse could be inferred. There are several
logical possibilities for how to proceed. For example, we could
attempt to infer what Sara would have wanted based on the
values and beliefs we attribute to her, we could simply leave the
decision to Sara’s family, the state could make whatever
reasonable and dignified use of Sara’s body it wished, or the
state could mandate as little interference as possible with the
body.
If the dead Sara continues to have an interest in
posthumous bodily integrity, there are two possible ways to
fulfill that interest. The first is to try to infer what Sara would
have wanted based on her personality, beliefs, and values. In
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64. See generally Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S. Applebaum, Substituted
Judgment: Best Interests in Disguise, 13 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 8 (1983), for a discussion
and history of the various tests used in substituted decision-making for
incompetents.
65. In fact, informed consent must accompany, practically, every procedure.
Informed Consent, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physicianresources/legal-topics/patient-physician-relationship-topics/informed-consent.page
(last visited May 23, 2013). This is because the medical and legal fields view
unwanted touching as battery. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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other words, surviving loved ones could enter into a process of
substitute decision-making not unlike that found in the medical
context in relation to incompetent patients.64
The second way to fulfill Sara’s posthumous bodily
integrity is to interfere as little as possible with Sara’s corpse.
Surviving friends and family may not be in the best position to
make a substitute decision, either because they may not have a
good sense of what Sara would have wanted, or because they
may be in a conflict of interest with the deceased if Sara and her
family wanted different things for Sara’s body. In the medical
context the default is non-interference without consent because
non-consensual interferences with the bodily integrity of the
living are considered to be potentially significant violations of
individual autonomy.65 Thus, in the absence of known wishes,
the preferable course of action may be to permit as few
interferences with a corpse as possible by, for example,
prohibiting organ donation and medical research or education.
Of course a body must be disposed of in some manner. If Sara’s
wishes cannot be inferred, either burial or cremation, the two
most common and accepted means of disposal, would seem
appropriate.
That said, a right to posthumous bodily integrity exists for
different reasons than the right to bodily integrity while alive: it
can only protect critical interests, not experiential ones. As a
result, the balancing of the deceased’s interests against the
interests of others in the treatment of the deceased’s body need
not lead to the same outcome in relation to dead bodies as live
ones. If the interest in posthumous bodily integrity is seen as
less compelling than the interests in bodily integrity of the living
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66. See Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
1115, 1187–96 (2008), for a discussion of why certain kinds of defaults may be
performed.
67. Survey Shows Many Want to Donate Organs, But Few Do, U.S. NEWS HEALTH
DAY (Apr. 16, 2009), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/managing-yourhealthcare/articles/2009/04/16/survey-shows-many-want-to-donate-organs-but-fewdo.
68. See discussion supra Part II.
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(perhaps because of the lack of experiential interests), an
argument could be made for setting different defaults for the
dead than for the living. For example, all dignified interferences
with a corpse could be allowed unless one opts out. That might
encourage people to make an active decision about organ
donation, for example. Alternately, the default could reflect
what a majority of people would choose to do if they addressed
the issue.66 In the organ donation context, at least, it is well
established that most people would consent to being donors,
even though most people do not legally register any
preference.67 This fact, combined with the benefit to recipients of
an opt-out default, could be argued to justify an opt-out
approach to organ donation. The point is that a default of noninterference in the absence of consent, while appropriate in
relation to living bodies, is less obviously appropriate in relation
to dead bodies even if the dead have ongoing interests.
The above analysis is oversimplified in that it assumes a
Feinberg/Pitcher rather than a Kramer approach to the interests
of the dead. On Feinberg and Pitcher’s theories, an individual’s
interests would seem to survive death regardless of whether the
content of those interests was known to others.68 According to
Kramer, however, only Sara’s desires that are reflected in what
others knew about Sara survive death. Based on the latter
approach, it is unclear whether friends and family should
undertake to infer what Sara would have wanted because it is
not clear whether the dead Sara retains an interest in desires that
might be inferable but were never expressed. To the extent the
interests of the dead relate to the way the dead live on in the
memories of the living, those interests can perhaps be met so
long as surviving family and friends think they are doing what
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the individual would have wanted. For example, Sara’s interests
would be met under Kramer’s approach, but not under
Feinberg’s, by burying her with her husband if she had a secret
true love with whom she would rather have been buried.
Whether or not, and to what extent, family members should try
to infer the deceased’s prior wishes should then, perhaps,
depend on the degree to which the family members have
confidence in their ability to infer those wishes.
If, on the other hand, Sara no longer has an interest in
bodily integrity and the interests and rights at stake are only
those of other living individuals in the future treatment of their
own cadavers, the actions one should take in relation to
unexpressed wishes are sometimes different.
It may be
appropriate for friends and family to try to infer the deceased’s
prior wishes. The reason for this, however, is to give confidence
to living individuals that their own families will make decisions
that reflect those individuals’ beliefs and values.
It is less obvious in the context of unexpressed wishes,
however, that we should seek to infer Sara’s prior wishes in
order to give confidence to the living that their own wishes will
be respected. People will not necessarily have confidence that
unexpressed wishes will be inferred and respected. In addition,
those who do not express particular wishes regarding the
treatment of their dead bodies may not have critical interests in
the treatment of their corpse one way or another. Yet, one
should be careful not to assume a person had no critical interests
regarding the treatment of her corpse just because no wishes
were expressed.
One’s posthumous interests are deeply
personal, and conversations about the treatment and disposal of
dead bodies are often considered upsetting, morbid, or taboo.
There are, therefore, many reasons why such matters may not
explicitly be discussed before death.
If Sara expressed no wishes because she had no critical
interests, then there is no need to try to infer what she would
have wanted if her interests terminated on her death. However,
even if Sara did have unexpressed critical interests, she is now
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dead and has no interests. The goal of assuring the living that
their wishes will be respected is not jeopardized because we
have not ignored Sara’s wishes – we simply do not know what
they were. The implication of this is that if interests belong only
to the living, it does not matter – from the perspective of an
interest in posthumous bodily integrity – what is done to the
corpse (within reason, as discussed below). The family’s own
wishes could prevail, or the law could mandate doing nothing or
donating organs without the individual’s prior consent. None of
these actions could violate the interests of the interest-holder,
because she no longer exists. Nor are these actions harmful to
the critical interests of the living in the treatment of their own
corpses if no promises were broken and people’s belief that their
own wishes will be respected is not obviously threatened.
Nothing in the foregoing precludes next of kin from trying
to guess what the person would have wanted and making their
decision on that basis. But if only the living have interests, that
decision only respects the next of kin’s own interests in the
treatment of a loved one’s body and not those of the deceased or
of a living person in relation to her own future corpse.
C. PRIOR WISHES UNKNOWN
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69. Although, see discussion supra Part II, for a discussion of balancing those
interests in setting defaults.
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Now imagine that Sara has died without expressing her
wishes regarding the treatment of her corpse and she has no
surviving friends or family to make a substitute decision based
on her inferred wishes. Further, she had no known affiliations
from which her wishes could be inferred. In this case, respecting
the interests of the dead in posthumous bodily integrity may
require doing as little as possible to Sara’s corpse. She will be
harmed by interferences with her corpse that she would not
have agreed to; and so, like in the medical context, the default
should be not to touch her body any more than necessary
without consent.69 Again, however, the distinction between
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70. See discussion supra Part II.
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Feinberg and Kramer’s approaches complicates matters
somewhat. Under Kramer’s view, a deceased person with no
surviving friends or family generally has no posthumous
interests.70 Therefore the conclusion that we should interfere as
little as possible with Sara’s corpse applies only to a
Feinberg/Pitcher approach to posthumous interests.
If, however, Sara’s interests in the treatment of her corpse
terminate on her death, it should be permissible to do almost
anything with her body without violating an interest in
posthumous bodily integrity. This does not mean that others’
interests cannot be affected: undignified treatment of a corpse,
for example, may harm the interests of surviving friends and
family as well as society at large, which has an interest in the
dignified treatment of human remains. The point is that the
interests of a living individual in her own posthumous bodily
integrity cannot be affected by what is done to her own corpse.
If the dead have no interests and the right to posthumous bodily
integrity therefore belongs only to living individuals, the
individual whose corpse is at issue has no interests or rights to
be violated after her death. The interests of other living people
in their own posthumous bodily integrity are also arguably not
threatened by, for example, taking the organs of those whose
prior wishes are unknowable, because the living can avoid this
fate by expressing their wishes to others, especially in a legally
binding format.
The ability to do almost anything to the corpse of someone
whose wishes are unknown, without affecting an interest in
posthumous bodily integrity, is perhaps the most significant
difference between viewing an interest in posthumous bodily
integrity as belonging only to living individuals versus
persisting after death.
Note the qualification above – one may do almost anything
without affecting a posthumous interest in bodily integrity. This
limitation relates to unusual, and therefore unpredictable,
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treatment of a corpse, exemplified here by cryonic preservation
and plastination for the purposes of public display.
If only living people have an interest in their own
posthumous bodily integrity, it may, nevertheless, be
inappropriate to permit unusual interferences with a corpse in
the absence of expressed or inferable wishes. There are two
reasons for this. First, because these practices are very unusual,
most people would not think to express an opinion about them.
Second, and relatedly, these practices are unusual in part
because most people do not want their bodies treated in this
way: they do not want to be cryonically frozen or put on display.
Whereas the first reason suggests that people have formed
opinions that they simply do not express, the second is
consistent with the possibility that an individual never formed
an opinion, while alive, about a particular treatment of his or her
corpse. This would fall under the category of wishes not
expressed and not inferable, but there may be a moral
distinction between acting in a manner the deceased might have
actually opposed while alive, although we have no way of
knowing of that opposition now, and acting in a manner the
deceased never contemplated. In other words, it may be worse
to cryonically freeze someone who, while alive, thought the idea
repulsive but left no clue of that view to others after her death,
than to do the same to someone who never turned her mind to
the possibility while alive.
My intuition is that the former is only worse than the latter
if one thinks that the dead have a right to posthumous bodily
integrity on a Feinberg-type basis. If all interests end with
death, or if the dead have interests only to the extent they are
remembered by the living, then there is no greater harm to the
dead in going against a person’s existing but unexpressed and
unknown wishes than there is in doing something that the
deceased had no opinion on in life but might have opposed had
she considered the options. Only if the dead have ongoing
interests that are not dependent on what the living know about
them is the possibility of a moral difference plausible. Then I
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71. It is still arguable that there is harm to society at large, based on human
dignity, if we allow organ donation by those who didn’t affirmatively express a
wish to be donors. Alternately, of course, is the argument that potential organ
recipients have interests that should trump any individual’s interest in deciding
what will become of her cadaver. Recall, however, that the focus of this article is
the right to posthumous bodily integrity in relation to one’s own body.
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believe a reasonable argument could be made that it is morally
worse to violate interests held but not communicated than to act
in a manner that might have been contrary to the person’s
wishes had she contemplated the issue.
The point of limiting unusual or unpopular uses of corpses
to situations in which there is actual prior consent is that if we
imposed such uses in the absence of expressed wishes living
people might not have their critical interests in the treatment of
their bodies satisfied. They might worry that anything not
expressly mentioned before death would be fair game and
might, therefore, worry about the fate of their remains.
It is highly unlikely that families or the state would want to
donate people’s corpses for such procedures without knowing it
was what the deceased wanted. But the point is that if an
interest in posthumous bodily integrity belonged only to the
living we could act morally – at least in relation to the interests
of living people in their own bodies71 – by either burying or
cremating the bodies of those who expressed no view before
death and whose wishes were not inferable, but not by
displaying those people’s corpses in Body Worlds. This is
because burial and cremation are both sufficiently well known
and acceptable to most of the population – there is no harm done
to the critical interests of the living by making, say, cremation,
the default for those who expressed no views while alive.
Neither of these things is true of less frequent interferences such
as plastination and cryonic preservation: they are both little
known and much less popular. Organ donation presumably
falls somewhere in between, in that most people express a
willingness to donate but there are significant numbers of
people who do not want to be donors, and donation is still
relatively rare.
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Part II demonstrated how the living and the dead can, at least in
theory, have interests in relation to posthumous events and how
these interests can ground legal rights in relation to what
happens after death. Part III demonstrated some of the moral
implications that flow from viewing an interest in posthumous
bodily integrity as belonging to the dead or only to living
individuals. With this foundation in place, Part IV considers
specific types of decisions that can be made about one’s corpse
and examines how existing laws reflect the analysis in Part III.
That is, it examines whether existing laws reflect a view that the
dead have an interest in posthumous bodily integrity or a view
that only the living do. It also considers how laws might be
changed to reflect one view or the other.
Recall why it is that (living or dead) individuals may have
interests in relation to their cadavers. Essentially, most people
care, to varying degrees, what happens to their bodies after they
die. Many have a strong preference for burial or cremation (and
spend considerable sums on solid wood caskets or decorative
urns); some want to be organ donors, while others wish to be
interred intact, and therefore wish to avoid not only organ
donation but autopsy, if possible. These wishes may reflect
critical interests in following the tenets of one’s religion, in being
altruistic, or in any number of views about the good life. And
so, we have enacted laws to protect these interests.
The laws discussed below grant rights to posthumous
bodily integrity in relation to individuals’ own corpses. These
laws in no way deny, and often affirm, that others will also have
an interest in the treatment of that corpse. For example,
surviving friends and family can be harmed by the careless
treatment of a loved one’s remains, or by having a loved one’s
organs removed for transplantation if that is disturbing to
surviving family members. In addition, society has an interest
in ensuring that human remains are treated with dignity. It
may, therefore, be evident that people should treat human
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72. See, e.g., 2012 NEV. STAT. 201.450 (“A person who commits a sexual
penetration on the dead body of a human being is guilty of a category A felony . . .
.”).
73. It may seem unlikely that someone would provide advance consent to
necrophilia, but there are many people who consider their corpses to be no more
than tissue and would conceivably consent to necrophilia. Regardless, the point is
that such consent would be legally irrelevant.
74. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 144, § 35 (2012) (prohibiting burial near a
water supply).
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corpses with respect, but it does not follow from that premise
that there should be a right to bodily integrity in relation to one’s
own dead body. A right to posthumous bodily integrity means
not only that certain interferences are not allowed, but that it’s
the entity whose body is at issue whose rights stand to be
violated. Thus, laws that respect a right to posthumous bodily
integrity must be distinguished from laws that protect corpses
from interference but do not treat the (living or dead) person
whose corpse is at stake as the rights-holder.
For example, many U.S. states criminalize certain acts in
relation to a corpse on the basis that they are undignified.
Necrophilia is commonly prohibited, either expressly or
implicitly.72 It is a criminal act regardless of whether a person
consents in advance to having her dead body used in this way.73
Other laws require dignified disposal of corpses in certain
prescribed locations that will avoid possible threats to public
health.74 These reflect both society’s interest in the dignified
treatment of corpses and its interest in disposing of corpses in a
manner that protects the well-being of the living. Of course
necrophilia and undignified disposal could also harm the loved
ones of the deceased. The point is not that necrophilia only
harms the general public but rather that it is harmful regardless
of whether it can be said to be harmful to the deceased. The
prohibition on necrophilia and the requirement of a dignified
disposal are therefore not primarily concerned with posthumous
bodily integrity.
The right to posthumous bodily integrity is reflected in laws
that require an individual’s consent for most expected (and
some unexpected) interferences with a corpse. The consent
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required is preferably the advanced consent of the person whose
deceased body is at issue. The substitute consent of the next of
kin or executor may suffice, but only in the absence of the
advance consent of the deceased. In other words, these laws
grant individuals a legal right to make binding decisions about
the treatment of their bodies after death. In particular, laws
governing organ donation, medical education and research on
cadavers, choosing burial or cremation, and posthumous
reproduction reflect an interest in posthumous bodily integrity.
A. ORGAN DONATION

C M
Y K
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75. Acts:
Anatomical
Gift
Act
(2006),
UNIF.
L.
COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical%20Gift%20Act%20(2006)
(last visited May 17, 2013).
76. U.A.G.A. § 4 (2008).
77. U.A.G.A. §§ 4–5 (2008).
78. U.A.G.A. § 5 (2008).
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The discussion of organ donation first demonstrates that
organ donation laws grant a right to posthumous bodily
integrity and then considers whether that right belongs only to
the living, or also to the dead. Put another way, it examines the
implications for organ donation policy of whether the right not
to be an organ donor survives death.
All U.S. states have adopted some version of the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act, the majority of which have adopted the
2006 version (hereinafter referred to as the UAGA).75 The
UAGA grants competent adults the legal right to decide whether
or not to be posthumous organ donors.76 The default under the
UAGA is that no organ donation will occur.77 Consent is
required to displace that default.78 In other words, the UAGA
reflects an opt-in approach to organ donation, which is the case
in all common law countries but not in many civil law countries,
where the default is to allow donation unless a donor or her next
of kin has expressed a wish not to be an organ donor.
Section 4 of the UAGA states: “an anatomical gift of a
donor’s body or part may be made during the life of the donor
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79. U.A.G.A. § 4 (2008).
80. U.A.G.A. §§ 5, 10 (2008).
81. U.A.G.A. § 4 (2008).
82. U.A.G.A. § 6 (2008).
83. U.A.G.A. § 7 (2008).
84. U.A.G.A. § 9 (2008).
85. U.A.G.A. § 7(d) (2008).
86. For description and discussion of the family veto, see Jennifer L. MesichBrant & Lawrence J. Grossback, Assisting Altruism: Evaluating Legally Binding
Consent in Organ Donation Policy, 30 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 687 (2005);
Wilkinson, supra note 35, at 87–88; T. M. Wilkinson, Individual and Family Decisions
About Organ Donation, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 26 (2007); and Paula Boddington, Organ
Donation After Death – Should I Decide, or Should My Family?,15 J. APPLIED PHIL. 69
(1998).
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for the purpose of transplantation, therapy, research, or
education . . . .”79 Consent to donating one’s organs may be
given in a will, in a signed organ donor card, or orally.80 An
individual may choose to donate all or only certain parts of her
body, at her discretion.81 She may also withdraw consent at any
time before death.82
The UAGA provides not only for consent but also for
legally binding refusals to consent.83 Although refusal is
presumed, where the deceased did not consent or refuse in a
legally recognized manner, family members, in a hierarchy set
out by the UAGA, may decide whether to donate their relative’s
organs.84 Refusing to donate, as opposed to not deciding
whether to donate, means that the family has no legal authority
to consent to donation on the deceased’s behalf.85
Notwithstanding that the UAGA clearly grants priority in
decision-making to the individual potential donor, there is a
well-documented practice of medical staff adhering to the
wishes of surviving family members to refuse donation even if
the deceased previously consented. In practice, even where an
individual has given her legally binding consent to being an
organ donor, organs will not be retrieved in the face of
opposition by the family. This is known as the family veto.86
In response to the family veto, the 2006 version of the
UAGA makes explicit that the law grants the decision to donate
first to the individual potential donor and not the surviving
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87. U.A.G.A. § 8 (2008).
88. See discussion supra Part III.
89. Many states have statutorily adopted a substitute decision standard – at
least for certain types of treatment decisions. In Illinois, for example, the Health
Care Surrogate Act states that treatment decisions for an incompetent patient
should “conform[] as closely as possible to what the patient would have done or
intended under the circumstances.” Health Care Surrogate Act, 755 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 40/20 (2007). For a discussion of the substitute judgment standard and how
courts have adopted it, see ROBERT S. OLICK, TAKING ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
SERIOUSLY: PROSPECTIVE AUTONOMY AND DECISIONS NEAR THE END OF LIFE 5–9
(2001).
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family: “[I]n the absence of an express, contrary indication by
the donor, a person other than the donor is barred from making,
amending, or revoking an anatomical gift of a donor’s body or
part if the donor made an anatomical gift of the donor’s body or
part . . . .”87 The family may only consent to donation of the
deceased’s body or refuse to consent if the deceased did not
legally consent or refuse consent while alive. There is no
positive right to be a donor, in that there may be no usable
organs or viable recipient, but there is effectively a right not to
have your wishes overridden by your next of kin.
The provisions of the UAGA, therefore, largely mirror the
law with regard to consent to medical treatment.88 The
“patient,” if competent, has the right to consent; and, in the
absence of consent, donation is legally impermissible.
Alternatively, if the “patient” did not make her wishes known
before becoming incompetent, a family member may provide
substitute consent.
One potential difference between the law of substitute
consent to medical decisions and the family’s authority to
consent under the UAGA relates to the basis on which the
substitute decision must be made. In relation to incompetent
patients, substitute decisions regarding medical treatment
should, generally, be based on what the patients would have
wanted for themselves or, alternately, in the patients’ best
interests.89 Incompetence does not change the fact that the
patient’s interests are given priority. The UAGA, on the other
hand, does not require the family to base its decision on what

33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 51 Side A

07/02/2013 13:56:24

PUBLISHED.YOUNG.MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

POSTHUMOUS BODILY INTEGRITY

6/17/2013 1:02 PM

237

they think the deceased would have wanted.90 However, the
decision is not left entirely to their discretion. Some states’ laws
indicate that if it is known that the deceased would have
opposed donation, the next of kin may not consent to it, even if
the deceased’s opposition was not expressed in a legally binding
manner.91
Another difference between the medical context and the
organ donation context relates to the existence of the family
veto, which suggests that the right to posthumous bodily
integrity regarding organ donation may, de facto, be weaker than
it appears on the face of the law. There is no analogy to the
family veto regarding incompetent patients: I am aware of no
significant practice of rejecting patients’ legally valid and clear
advance directives in the face of opposition by family
members.92
Organ donation law, therefore, provides an example of a
legal right to posthumous bodily integrity. It makes the default
that no donation can occur without consent, and prioritizes the
individual’s consent over that of the family. This need not be so:

07/02/2013 13:56:24
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90. U.A.G.A. § 8 (2008).
91. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4301 (McKinney 2007).
(Any of the following persons, in the order of priority stated, may . . . in
the absence of actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent . . . or
reason to believe that an anatomical gift is contrary to the decedent's
religious or moral beliefs, give all or any part of the decedent's body for
any purpose specified . . . .).
See also Illinois Anatomical Gift Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/5-5(b) (2007) (“If
no gift has been executed under subsection (a), any of the following persons . . . and
in the absence of (i) actual notice of contrary intentions by the decedent . . . may consent
. . . .”); and Illinois Anatomical Gift Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/5-20(c) (2007)
(If (1) the hospital . . . has actual notice of opposition to the gift by the
decedent . . . or (2) there is reason to believe that an anatomical gift is
contrary to the decedent's religious beliefs . . . then the gift of all or any
part of the decedent's body shall not be requested.).
92. Advance directives, and other instructions that precede incapacity, can be
problematic and the law does not always require them to be followed. One
particular difficulty is that it is difficult for people to anticipate circumstances in
enough detail that physicians have confidence that they know what the individual
would have wanted in the situation that actually materializes. However, where the
patient’s previously expressed wishes are sufficiently clear and applicable to her
present situation, the family has no right to substitute its own wishes for her
treatment. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 154.01–.3 (2012) (granting priority to advance
directives).
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the state could conscript organs, it could leave the decision to
the family, or it could, at least, presume consent so as to increase
the supply of organs available for donation. The law prioritizes
individuals’ interest in posthumous bodily integrity over the
interests of the sick and dying in receiving needed organs and, at
least in theory, prioritizes individuals’ interest in posthumous
bodily integrity over the interests of loved ones in deciding
whether they want to donate the deceased’s organs. The family
veto suggests, however, that in practice there is some
disagreement, at least among certain medical practitioners, with
the way the law has prioritized the interests of individual
potential donors over those of their loved ones.
Consider now whose right to posthumous bodily integrity
the UAGA seeks to protect. Given the discussion in Part III,
there are good reasons for respecting individuals’ express
consent or refusal to consent to being an organ donor, regardless
of whether an interest in posthumous bodily integrity survives
death. This is because respecting express wishes would protect
the interests of the dead, if they have any, and would respect the
critical interests of living people in their posthumous bodily
integrity by giving them confidence that their own wishes will
be respected in the future. Thus, the UAGA’s requirement that
the deceased’s express wishes be respected is consistent with
either the dead having or not having a continued right to
posthumous bodily integrity.
Where an individual’s wishes regarding organ donation
were not made explicit (legally or otherwise) but are inferable,
the law leaves the decision to the family, subject to the caveat
that some states preclude the family consenting if it is known
that the individual would have objected to being an organ
donor. Again, the law is consistent with the relevant right to
posthumous bodily integrity belonging either only to the living
individual or persisting after death, but for different reasons. If
the deceased is thought to have an ongoing right to posthumous
bodily integrity, Part III.B suggests that the best way to fulfill the
deceased’s ongoing interests is for the law to mirror that of
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substitute consent to medical treatment: a substitute decisionmaker should make the decision that best reflects what the
deceased would have wanted for herself. This is essentially
what the UAGA accomplishes.
However, if any interest in posthumous bodily integrity
ends with death, the law might reasonably still allow for
substitute decision-making where the deceased’s prior wishes
are inferable. The purpose, however, would not be to respect
the rights of the dead, but rather to give confidence to the living
that their own inferable wishes will be respected.
In the situation where the deceased’s prior wishes are
unknowable, however, it does make a difference whether the
relevant right to posthumous bodily integrity survives death or
not and if so, on what basis. If the deceased has an ongoing
right to posthumous bodily integrity generally, she will either be
harmed by having organs removed contrary to her prior
unexpressed wishes (on a Feinberg-style approach) or else her
unexpressed wishes cannot form the basis of a posthumous
interest (on a Kramer-style approach). If the deceased can have
no rights, then the result is the same as on a Kramer-style
approach: an unexpressed wish cannot form the basis of a
posthumous right.
Anatomical gift law presumes a refusal to consent in the
absence of known wishes. This could reflect a view that the
dead have a right to posthumous bodily integrity on a Feinberg
model, in that we should err on the side of presuming nonconsent to avoid potential harm to the dead. Alternately, it
could reflect a view that the right of the living to decide whether
to be organ donors justifies precluding donation without their
express consent. That is, even where people’s prior wishes are
unknowable, it could give comfort to the living to know that
they will never be made organ donors unless they, or their next
of kin, affirmatively authorize it.
The law is, therefore, consistent with both approaches to the
right to posthumous bodily integrity, but the implications of one
are much more radical than the other. Organ donation law
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requires balancing the interests of multiple stakeholders in the
use of dead bodies. As seen above, it prioritizes the interests of
the potential organ donor over those of potential organ
recipients, the families of both, and the interests of society
generally. But if any right to posthumous bodily integrity ends
at death, the interest protected is much weaker than that if the
right survives death. If the right ends at death, it would mean
that our laws protect people’s right not to have to make a
decision about organ donation, and still not have to worry about
being donors, over the competing rights of potential recipients,
among others. It is one thing to submit a rights-holder (namely
the dead person) to unwanted bodily interference. But if the
dead have no rights, the only interest in posthumous bodily
integrity at stake is that of the living in believing their wishes
will be carried out. They can never actually be subject to bodily
interference contrary to their rights, because once dead they no
longer have a right to posthumous bodily integrity. Any
violation that would result from allowing the removal of organs
from those whose wishes were unknown would be a violation in
the form of disturbing the peace of mind that comes from
believing one’s critical interests will be fulfilled. However, that
violation can be avoided if the individual makes a legally
binding decision about organ donation. Some states also protect
against unwanted donation where a person’s wish not to donate
is known but wasn’t legally recorded.93
Thus, if the dead have no ongoing rights, then to preclude
donation in the absence of any known wishes is to rate a living
person’s critical interests in her dead body very highly. This
gives greater weight to people’s right not to make a decision and
still not be an organ donor, than to the competing interests of
potential organ recipients, for whom the matter may be one of
life or death. It is, therefore, harder to justify an opt-in default
for people whose wishes are unknowable if the dead have no
ongoing interest in posthumous bodily integrity than if they do.

07/02/2013 13:56:24

93. See supra text accompanying note 91.
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94. See generally David Rodriguez-Arias et al., Success Factors and Ethical
Challenges of the Spanish Model of Organ Donation, 376 LANCET 1109 (2010)
(discussing the opt-out method).
95. Id. at 1110.
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This is not to say that existing anatomical gift law cannot be
justified if the dead have no rights. But it is easier to justify – at
least where the deceased’s prior wishes are unknowable – if the
dead also have a right to posthumous bodily integrity.
The policy debate over opting in or out of organ donation
never explicitly addresses who holds the rights. The distinction
between the living or dead as bearers of a right to posthumous
bodily integrity, although somewhat philosophical, might be
useful in policy debates. For example, those who do not view
the dead as rights-bearers and who support an opt-out model of
organ donation, like Spain’s,94 could rely on arguments in the
previous paragraphs. That said, these arguments support an
opt-out model most strongly in relation only to those whose
wishes are unknowable, not to those whose wishes were
express. For those whose wishes can be inferred, there are good
reasons, even if the dead have no rights, to respect them. This
might therefore best be reflected in a European-style policy
where the default is consent but in practice, any family objection
is sufficient to preclude donation.95 For those who consider the
dead to have ongoing rights to bodily integrity, especially on a
Feinberg model, the argument in favor of current consent
defaults in organ donation law is easier to make.
Given the foregoing, I suggest an intermediate proposal for
amendments to organ donation law that should be palatable if
the dead are thought to have no right to posthumous bodily
integrity. The law could allow organ donation where there is
neither a registered refusal to consent, nor any means of
inferring the individual’s wishes. As a practical matter, this
would mean where there is no accessible next of kin who objects
to donation. Any such amendments are only appropriate where
the law permits the registration of a refusal, which is the case
under the 2006 UAGA, but not in Ontario, Canada, for example,
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96. The website of the agency responsible for organ and tissue donation in
Ontario has a “Frequently Asked Questions” section. In response to the question:
“Why are only ‘Yes’ responses to donation being collected?” it states: “Our goal is
to increase organ and tissue donation in Ontario. Our research shows jurisdictions
that have instituted a ‘Yes’ only registry have experienced an increase in donor
registrations.” Frequently Asked Questions, TRILLIUM GIFT OF LIFE NETWORK,
http://www.giftoflife.on.ca/en/faq.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
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where it is only possible to register consent, not refusal. 96
Without being able to register a refusal, it would be impossible
for those without friends and family to avoid unwanted use of
their remains.
It could be argued that a distinction in legally permissible
treatment based on whether wishes are inferable would make
the law too complicated. However, if one were of the view that
the dead have no rights, and was convinced of the moral
differences between those without explicit or inferable wishes
and those who left instructions or whose wishes can be inferred
as set out above, complexity would be a poor reason for
maintaining the status quo. After all, by not requiring consent
from a subset of the population, the number of available donor
organs would increase, thereby saving lives.
More problematic is the fact that such a distinction would
suggest differential, and arguably worse, treatment of the bodies
of those who were most alone in life. If Sara had friends and
family to pass along her wishes, those wishes would be
respected; but, if she didn’t, her body would be subject to
treatment that may be contrary to the interests she held while
alive. Such a policy of differential treatment would be unlikely
to be acceptable to the public, but it is not clear why. It could be
that the public believes the dead have rights, and so differential
treatment of this kind would harm those dead whose wishes
were not inferable. Alternately, the public could view such
differential treatment as impermissible because it would be
unacceptable in relation to living bodies. This begs the question
whether the fact of death changes the moral issues at stake, but
the point is that such policy might be a non-starter.
Another potential objection to this proposal relates to the

33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 54 Side A

07/02/2013 13:56:24

PUBLISHED.YOUNG.MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

POSTHUMOUS BODILY INTEGRITY

6/17/2013 1:02 PM

243

C M
Y K

07/02/2013 13:56:24

97. Although no U.S. states have presumed consent legislation, several have
proposed bills that would have implemented some form of presumed consent. See,
e.g., S. 7721, 233rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2010); S. 3613, 96th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2010); S. 11-042, 68th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2011).
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short timeframe in which organs may viably be procured for
donation. It may be that the next of kin cannot be contacted
immediately but is reached after, say, 48 hours. It is problematic
to imagine taking organs because the next of kin cannot be
found and there is no registered refusal, only to discover a day
later that the deceased, while alive, made her objections to organ
donation known. There are two responses to this problem, both
of which require a balancing of competing interests. First, one
could reject the proposed amendment altogether, so as to avoid
that unpleasant outcome (thereby giving greater weight to the
interests of living individuals in posthumous bodily integrity
than to the interests of potential organ recipients). Alternately,
one could acknowledge and accept that risk.
I am inclined toward the latter, although I acknowledge that
the public may not be ready for such a change to the status quo.
That said, various state legislatures have attempted to institute
laws that would presume consent to organ donation.97 Since this
would have similar effects to my proposal regarding those with
no legally expressed wishes and no next of kin (that is, their
organs could be procured), my proposed amendment is perhaps
not unrealistic. In fact, my proposal has one advantage over
presumed consent in that it is more consistent with anatomical
gifts as an altruistic act. Rather than presuming that people want
to make the gift, it presumes they do not and requires an
affirmative act to change that default. However, the proposal
recognizes that once that person is dead, she no longer has any
interest in what happens to her body and allows a gift to occur
in the absence of known or inferable wishes.
In addition, laws already exist that allow the removal of
certain tissues from corpses without consent, so long as there is
no known objection. For example, some states allow removal of
pituitary glands or corneas so long as there is no known
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B. MEDICAL RESEARCH AND EDUCATION
Another way in which the law protects an interest in
posthumous bodily integrity is through limitations on when and
how a corpse may be used for medical research or education.
Like organ donation, the issue of medical research and
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98. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-320 (2009). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-10621 (2012).
99. See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002).
Sathyavaglswaran involved a lawsuit brought by parents who objected to the nonconsensual removal of their deceased child’s corneas. In addition, the trend seems
to lean toward states requiring consent for the removal of all tissue.
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opposition to removal.98 In other words, there is an opt-out
rather than an opt-in approach to removing pituitary glands and
corneas in some states. Although pituitary glands and corneas
are different than hearts or kidneys, I see no reason why the
nature of the consent requirement should depend on the nature
of the organ. Or if it does, the consent requirement should
arguably be less strict regarding life-saving organs than
regarding the organs that improve but do not (directly) save
lives. Note, however, that although such laws exist, it is far from
clear that the public accepts removal of even pituitary glands
and corneas without consent.99
To summarize, U.S. anatomical gift law requires consent for
organ donation, and preferably the prior consent of the
deceased. This is true regardless of whether the deceased’s
wishes are known or knowable. This is consistent with either
the dead or only the living having an interest in posthumous
bodily integrity; but, it is easier to reconcile, where the
deceased’s wishes are unknowable, with the former. If the
public and legislators are of the view that interests protected by
law can belong only to the living, they should consider
amending anatomical gift legislation so as to permit the use of
organs in the absence of the individual’s prior consent if that
individual’s wishes were not expressed and cannot now be
known.
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100. Acts: Anatomical Gift Act (2006), UNIF. L. COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical%20Gift%20Act%20(2006)
(last visited May 17, 2013).
101. See, e.g., Illinois Anatomical Gift Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/5-10 (2007).
102. U.A.G.A. §§ 8–9 (2008).
103. Some states’ legislation explicitly provide that the donee may accept or
reject the gift. See, e.g., Illinois Anatomical Gift Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/5-45(a)
(2007).
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education is governed by state legislation that, for the most part,
has adopted the UAGA.100 Such statutes set out purposes for
which anatomical gifts may be made; and, in addition to organ
transplantation these include medical and dental research, and
medical or dental education.101 The same consent requirements
apply as regarding cadaveric organ donation: the default is that
no research or educational use is permitted, consent is required
to displace this default, and the family’s wishes are only legally
relevant if the deceased did not express her consent or refusal in
a legally valid manner.102 It is likely that, by analogy to the
family veto in the organ donation context, research and
educational facilities would be reluctant to take possession of a
corpse to which they were legally entitled in the face of
opposition by the surviving family. However, to the extent that
a right to posthumous bodily integrity is a negative right rather
than a positive right, this poses few problems. Certainly
hospitals and universities are not legally required to carry out
research on a corpse simply because the deceased’s prior consent
was obtained.103
As with organ donation, there are societal benefits that flow
from medical education and research. One could therefore
imagine a legal regime in which bodies were made available for
such use without the deceased’s prior consent or without the
next of kin’s consent. However, as with organ donation, the law
gives greater weight to the interest in posthumous bodily
integrity than to the competing interests of families and society.
By analogy with the discussion of organ donation above,
laws governing medical research and educational uses of
corpses can be reconciled either with a view that the dead have
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an ongoing interest in posthumous bodily integrity or that they
do not. This is especially true where the individual’s prior
wishes are known. But even if they are not known, the law still
favors individuals’ interest in posthumous bodily integrity over
the interests of those who benefit from medical education and
research. If only the living have a right to posthumous bodily
integrity, it would mean that people not only have the right to
refuse to have their corpse used for medical research, but also
they have a right to refuse to make a decision and still not have
their body studied. Given the benefit to the sick, medical
students, and society in general, it is less easy to justify this
outcome than if the dead themselves are construed as having a
right to their posthumous bodily integrity. If that were the case
it makes more sense to weigh the interest in posthumous bodily
integrity more heavily, since the potential harm is an unwilling
interference with the rights-holder’s body rather than the
knowledge that one’s critical interests may not be fulfilled if one
does not take affirmative steps to ensure they are protected.
This argument is, therefore, similar to one made above in
the organ donation context. However, in the medical education
and research context it is easier to justify giving priority to the
interests of the living in their posthumous bodily integrity over
those with competing interests than in the organ donation
context. This is because the competing interests in the medical
education and research contexts are less compelling than in the
organ donation context. In the former, there are important
benefits of medical education and research, but they do not
immediately save lives. A single cadaveric organ donor,
however, can save multiple lives. Thus, the law’s refusal to
allow the use of a person’s body for medical education and
research when that person’s wishes about such use are
unknowable is more justifiable, if the living have an interest in
posthumous bodily integrity, than the law’s refusal to allow
organ donation where the person’s wishes are unknowable. The
stakes are not as high.
Now consider my legislative proposal, above, that organ
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donation law allow organ procurement from cadavers where the
person’s prior wishes are unknowable. I argued that this was a
reasonable proposal if legislators (and the public generally) were
of the opinion that an interest in posthumous bodily integrity
does not survive death. In the context of medical research and
education such a proposal should be less objectionable than in
the organ donation context since there is less urgency regarding
the former than the latter. A greater window of time could be
allowed for finding next of kin so as to avoid the problem of
being unsure whether the deceased made her prior wishes
known. An amendment to anatomical gift laws could mirror
laws in some states that allow autopsy without the consent of
the next of kin only if the next of kin cannot be contacted within
a certain period of time. For example, Connecticut allows
autopsy without consent if a reasonable amount of time has
elapsed, during which the next of kin cannot be reached.104 A
reasonable amount of time is defined as between 12 and 48
hours.105
C. CHOOSING THE MEANS OF DISPOSAL
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104. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-286 (2009).
105. Id.
106. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
107. SPERLING, supra note 18, at 150 (citing O’Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906 (Cal.
1899); In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978); Fischer’s Estate v.
Fischer, 117 N.E.2d 855, 859 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954)).
108. Id. at 150–53.

33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 56 Side A

Laws in many states allow individuals to decide whether
they will be buried or cremated.106 These laws also protect an
interest in posthumous bodily integrity. At common law,
individuals cannot make legally binding decisions about the
means of disposal of their bodies. This is because the law of
succession is said only to contemplate transfers of property and
one’s body is not property at common law.107 Despite academic
challenges to both premises,108 courts applying the common law
have consistently held that testamentary or other expressed
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109. See, e.g., Saleh v. Reichert (1993), 104 D.LR. 4th 384, 391 (Can. Ont. (Gen.
Div.)) (stating that in Canada “the expressed wishes of a person as to the
disposition of his or her body cannot be enforced in law.”).
110. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1365.01(A) (2012).
111. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1365.01(C) (2012).
112. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-831.01(A) (2012).
113. See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/5 (2012).
114. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-13-11 (2013). In addition, all Canadian provinces
except Quebec and British Columbia leave that decision to the next of kin as a
matter of common law. See J. Downie et al., Family Override of Valid Donor Consent to
Postmortem Donation: Issues in Law and Practice, 40 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS
1255, 1257 (2008).
115. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201(2)(a)(i) (McKinney 2012).
116. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH Law § 4201(2)(c) (McKinney 2012) (stating that
a decedent’s wishes are constrained by what the agent believes is “lawful and
practicable”).
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wishes about the disposal of one’s corpse are not binding.109
That said, most U.S. states have overridden the common
law on this matter through legislation. In many states, the law
grants individuals the right to decide for themselves how their
corpses will be disposed. For example, Arizona law provides
that: “[a] legally competent adult may prepare a written
statement directing the cremation or other lawful disposition of
the legally competent adult’s own remains . . . .”110 Section C of
the same provision clarifies that if such a statement is made,
cemeteries and crematories do not need to obtain anyone else’s
consent to carry out the selected disposition.111 Further, the
person who has the legal duty to dispose of the body must
follow the deceased’s wishes regarding disposal, subject to
exceptions relating to reasonableness and financial burden.112
Many states have statutes similar to Arizona’s,113 but some
grant to next of kin the right to decide the means of disposal,114
while others allow individuals to designate whomever they wish
to make the decision.115 Depending on the state, that designated
person may or may not be bound to follow any validly
expressed instructions left by the deceased.116
In states where one may decide how one’s body will be
disposed, the decision is not unconstrained: in addition to
limitations of reasonableness and cost (mentioned above) there
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117. See SPERLING, supra note 18, at 171–85 (outlining limitations on the ability to
determine the manner of disposal of one’s corpse).
118. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 114, § 35 (2012).
119. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7102 (West 2012) (listing burial,
cremation, and burial at sea as legally valid means of disposing of a corpse).
120. Alcor Life Extension Found., Inc. v. Mitchell, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572, 575 (1992).
121. Mission of the Exhibitions, BODY WORLDS,
http://www.bodyworlds.com/en/exhibitions/mission_exhibitions.html (last visited
May 24, 2013).
122. Body Donation for Plastination, BODY WORLDS,
http://www.bodyworlds.com/en/body_donation.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
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are restrictions relating to public safety and dignity.117 Safety
concerns are reflected in laws that limit the locations in which
human remains (whether cremated or not) may be disposed –
for example not near a water supply.118
Usually the choice is between burial and cremation,119 but
other means of disposal may be legally available. For example,
in California having your body cryonically preserved – that is,
frozen and stored with the intent of being revived when
technology permits – is a legally valid means of disposal if a
cryonics company is selected as the donee of the body pursuant
to anatomical gift legislation.120
One can also designate an organization like Body Worlds to
be the donee of one’s corpse through anatomical gift legislation.
Recall that Body Worlds exhibits preserved corpses for
educational and artistic purposes.121 According to Body Worlds,
anatomical gift legislation is the legal mechanism by which it
receives corpses.122 As a result, consent is required. (As
discussed in Part I.A, competitor Bodies: The Exhibition uses
Chinese bodies whose consent would not have been obtained in
accordance with anatomical gift law.) However, most states
have not legislated specifically in relation to preserved cadaver
exhibits, and so it is not clear that those states would apply their
anatomical gift law to this context in the same way as to organ
donation or medical research. Further, I am aware of no
litigation regarding whether an individual’s consent to donate
her body to Body Worlds is legally binding. Presumably Body
Worlds would prefer to relinquish any legal claim to a cadaver
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123. See, e.g., H.R. 2299, 2008 Leg., Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2008) (requiring
evidence of informed consent for public display of human remains); Assemb. 1519,
2008 Leg., 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2008) (legislation was enacted in California but was
returned without Governor Schwarzenegger’s signature, and so did not become
law); S.B. 1130, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011).
124. FLA. STAT. § 406.61 (2009).
125. Giunta, supra note 1, at 183–84.
126. HAW. REV. STAT. § 327-38 (2013).
127. See Giunta, supra note 1, at 185–89 (discussing that the French litigation
against Bodies: The Exhibition relied on arguments based on the dignity of human
remains).
128. See, e.g., Alcor Life Extension Found., Inc. v. Mitchell, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572,
575 (1992); FLA. STAT. § 406.61 (2009).
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rather than risk the public relations nightmare of fighting with
grieving survivors over the right to inject the deceased with
polymers and put her on public display.
Some states have proposed legislation that would prohibit
such exhibitions for profit without the deceased’s prior
consent,123 but in most cases, these laws have not (yet) been
enacted. One exception is Florida where legislation prohibiting
certain displays of preserved cadavers without consent was
enacted in 2009.124 State legislative proposals have tended to
emphasize the need for consent rather than proscribing such
displays entirely.125
Contrary to this trend, Hawaii has banned Body Worlds-type
cadaver displays altogether, regardless of consent.126 Hawaii’s
law followed, and presumably was triggered by, the Bodies: The
Exhibition scandal over the non-consensual use of Chinese
prisoners’ bodies.
Both cryonic preservation and preserved cadaver exhibits
have been controversial, worldwide, in that some do not
consider them appropriate and respectful ways of treating
human remains.127 However, notwithstanding the controversy
surrounding the potential indignity, Americans can choose to
have their corpses cryonically preserved or put on public
display and the law may well protect this choice.128 Although
neither the common law nor legislation grant a positive right to
be cryonically preserved or put on display, laws such as state
anatomical gift legislation and specific statutes regarding

33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 58 Side A

07/02/2013 13:56:24

PUBLISHED.YOUNG.MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

POSTHUMOUS BODILY INTEGRITY

6/17/2013 1:02 PM

251

C M
Y K

07/02/2013 13:56:24

129. FLA. STAT. § 406.61 (2009).
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choosing the means of disposal of one’s corpse reflect a policy
decision that people should be allowed to choose what becomes
of their human remains. Legislation like Florida’s Public Health
law reflects a view that such exhibits should generally be
permitted unless there was no consent for that use of cadavers.129
Further, laws granting individuals the right to decide how their
corpses will be disposed of exemplify a legal right to
posthumous bodily integrity that takes precedence over the
wishes of the family and over some people’s sense of what
amounts to dignified treatment – at least in some states. That
interest, however, must give way to competing interests in other
contexts, such as where public health is at stake.
Having established that many states’ laws regarding
disposal of corpses grant a right to posthumous bodily integrity,
the question becomes whose posthumous bodily integrity? In
states that allow individuals to make the decision for
themselves, the law appears equally consistent with a view that
the interest ends at death or that it survives death. Allowing
individuals to decide for themselves could suggest that the dead
have an ongoing interest in how their bodies are treated, or that
only living individuals have an interest in how their future
corpses will be treated, but that allowing them to decide and
respecting that decision gives confidence to others that their
own critical interests will be protected.
However, the fact that some states maintain the common
law approach of not letting individuals decide for themselves
how their bodies will be disposed may suggest a view that the
interest in posthumous bodily integrity belongs only to the
living. It would arguably be a worse violation of a decedent’s
interests to make her final resting place one she would have
rejected than it would be a violation of a living person’s interest
in posthumous bodily integrity to simply deny him a say in
what his final resting place will be. This argument mirrors those
above in the organ donation and medical education contexts, in
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130. John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1027 (1994).
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Posthumous reproduction refers to conception or birth after
the death of one or both biological parents.130 It need not involve
interference with a corpse: for example, sperm or eggs can be
removed from the living and used to create an embryo after the
death of the genetic parent. This raises issues of reproductive
autonomy but need not implicate posthumous bodily integrity.
However, there are two types of reproduction in which
posthumous bodily integrity is necessarily implicated: postmortem sperm removal and the maintenance of a legally dead
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that it assumes a bodily interference contrary to the rightsholder’s interests is worse than uncertainty in relation to
whether one’s interests will be fulfilled. In any event, it seems
inconsistent to respect posthumous bodily integrity regarding
organ donation, medical research and education, but not
regarding the means of disposal. The traditional response to the
uniqueness of anatomical gifts is that they involve an altruistic
act, but this does not obviously address why the interest in
posthumous bodily integrity should be diminished in the
context of choosing the means of disposal.
Another possible explanation is that one’s body must be
disposed in some way and the decision about means is about
alternatives, not about whether one’s body will be interfered
with at all. Organ donation and educational and research uses,
on the other hand, are by no means inevitable. Finally, part of
the answer seems to lie in what treatment of corpses is most
common. Almost everyone is either buried or cremated after
death, and both are common, whereas very few of us will ever
be organ donors and even fewer still will be cryonically frozen
or put on display in a museum. It may be that the more
unexpected the use of one’s cadaver, the greater the interest
individuals have in making a binding decision about that use,
since it is less likely to be acceptable to them.
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131. See JESSICA ARONS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FUTURE CHOICES: ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 1 (2007).
132. Assemb. 8043, 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
133. See e.g., Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § 12, sch. 3
(Eng.); Assisted Human Reproduction Act, R.S.C. 2004, c. L-2 (Can.) (both
proscribing removing sperm for reproductive purposes without consent).
134. See, e.g., The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine, Posthumous Reproduction, 82 FERTIL. & STERIL. S260, S261 (Supp. 2004)
(stating that a request by a surviving spouse for posthumous sperm removal need
not be honored). See also Frances Batzer et al., Postmortem Parenthood and the Need for
a Protocol with Posthumous Sperm Procurement, 79 FERTIL. & STERIL. 1263, 1263, 1265,
1268 (2003) (acknowledging the lack of regulation and recommending protocols
that would require actual or inferred consent to posthumous sperm removal).
135. MINN. STAT. § 145C.10(g) (2012).
136. Id.
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woman’s body on life support to continue gestating a fetus.
Posthumous reproduction is largely unregulated in the
United States.131 (A bill that would have required consent for
posthumous sperm retrieval was proposed in New York but was
never enacted.)132 As a result, its permissibility, essentially,
depends on the protocols of clinics and hospitals.
Although there is no general legal right in the U.S. to
posthumous bodily integrity in relation to posthumous sperm
removal, the laws of certain other countries grant such a right133
and the ethics literature in the United States suggests that
reproduction-related interferences with a corpse should not be
permitted without the deceased’s prior consent.134
The situation is less clear regarding maintaining a pregnant
woman’s dead body on life support to enable a fetus to come to
term. On the one hand, in such situations, the woman’s prior
wishes appear to be legally determinative. Minnesota, for
example, which is among the states to have adopted the
Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act or the Uniform HealthCare Decisions Act, makes a woman’s wishes determinative.
Minnesota law provides that a pregnant woman is presumed to
have wanted to be maintained on life support for the purpose of
gestating her fetus to the point of viability.135 However, this is
only a presumption. Clear and convincing evidence that the
woman’s wishes were to the contrary would preclude
maintaining her on life support.136 (The requirement of “clear

33718-mqe_14-2 Sheet No. 59 Side B

07/02/2013 13:56:24

PUBLISHED.YOUNG.MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

254

MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR

6/17/2013 1:02 PM

[Vol. 14

C M
Y K

07/02/2013 13:56:24

Univ. Health Serv., Inc. v. Piazzi reprinted in 2 Issues L. & Med. 415 (1987).
Id. at 416–18.
Id. at 418.
See, e.g., DANIEL SPERLING, MANAGEMENT OF POST-MORTEM PREGNANCY:
LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS 133 (2006).
141. Carson Strong, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Sperm Retrieval After Death or
Persistent Vegetative State, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 347, 347–48 (1999).
137.
138.
139.
140.
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and convincing evidence” distinguishes posthumous sperm
removal, where the presumption is generally that the deceased
did not want to reproduce posthumously, from the situation of a
pregnant woman on life support.)
The University Health Services, Inc. v. Piazzi case,137 however,
suggests a different approach than Minnesota’s. It involved a
legal battle in Georgia over whether to maintain Donna Piazzi’s
legally dead body on life support in order to allow her fetus to
develop. She had left no instructions regarding this situation
and her husband and family opposed continued life support.
The biological father of the child, however, who was not Piazzi’s
husband, petitioned for the body to be maintained on life
support. The court held that since Donna Piazzi was dead she
had no constitutional right to privacy and relying in part on a
pregnancy clause in Georgia’s Natural Death Act, it granted the
biological father’s petition.138 Thus, despite no prior (explicit or
inferred) consent to having her body maintained on life support,
The
the court allowed such treatment of her body.139
inconsistency with Minnesota law lies not in the outcome but in
the fact that the court treated Donna Piazzi’s wishes as
irrelevant. That said, the case has been criticized as both poorly
reasoned and as having little precedential value, given its
reliance on the specific pregnancy clause of the Natural Death
Act.140
Even when consent is required, it is not clear to what extent
the law aims to protect posthumous bodily integrity per se, as
opposed to reproductive autonomy. Carson Strong notes that
the requirement for consent to posthumous sperm retrieval can
relate to two different issues: the physical interference with the
bodies of the dead and the reproductive issue.141 (And the same
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142. Id. at 348.
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is true regarding interferences with a dead pregnant woman’s
body.) He suggests that the former is only problematic in the
absence of consent.142 It may, therefore, be that guidelines in
relation to posthumous reproduction are largely consistent with
other laws granting a right to posthumous bodily integrity.
However, given the lack of legislation and case law in this
emerging area of the law, it is too soon to say what rights people
have in relation to reproduction-related interferences with their
corpses.
What is clear is that requiring prior consent for posthumous
reproduction would protect a right to posthumous bodily
integrity in a manner consistent either with the dead or only the
living being the rights-bearer. On Feinberg’s model the dead
rights-bearer would have an ongoing interest in the treatment of
her body and perhaps also in making reproductive decisions.
Prior consent should, therefore, be required, especially since
competing interests are weaker than in the organ donation
context, for example. The competing interest primarily involves
the deceased’s partner’s interest in having a child with the
deceased.
On Kramer’s model, the existence of ongoing interests that
could ground rights would depend on whether the deceased’s
prior wishes regarding posthumous reproduction were known
to living people.
If they are not known, posthumous
reproduction without consent cannot harm the deceased’s
interests in posthumous bodily integrity because she would
have none. Any harm to an interest in posthumous bodily
integrity would be in relation to the interests of the living, who
do not want to be posthumous parents without their explicit
consent. In that case, the law would likely still require prior
consent for posthumous reproduction so as to reassure the living
that they will not be posthumous parents without consent.
As with other laws that grant a right to posthumous bodily
integrity, requiring prior consent, although consistent with the
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dead having or not having an interest in posthumous bodily
integrity, is easier to justify on the former view. The interests of
the living in posthumous bodily integrity are implicated either
way, but if the dead also have such an interest, posthumous
reproduction against the deceased’s prior wishes amounts to an
additional, and not insignificant, interference with posthumous
bodily integrity.
E. RIGHT TO REFUSE AN AUTOPSY
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143. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4209-a, 4210, 4210-c (McKinney 2012);
MO. REV. STAT. § 194.115(1) (2012).
144. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4209-a, 4210, 4210-c (McKinney 2012). Other
states have similar provisions in regards to providing prior consent or refusal to
autopsy. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2 (2012), and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-12-4(A)(1)
(2012).
145. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2(b) (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-12-4(A)
(2012).
146. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-286 (2012).
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Autopsy is generally unlawful without consent, subject to
certain exceptions related to law enforcement and public
health.143 Some states provide for the deceased individual’s
prior consent or refusal. In New York, for example, if the
deceased is carrying a notarized card indicating a refusal to be
dissected or autopsied, that must be respected, subject to the
exceptions noted above.144 As in the anatomical gift context, in
the absence of consent or refusal by the deceased, the next of
kin’s consent to autopsy must be obtained.145 In many states,
however, there is no provision for the individual herself to
consent.146 This may reflect a view that the next of kin has a
better moral claim to consenting to autopsy than the individual
herself or, more likely in my opinion, it may reflect the common
law, by virtue of which the next of kin had rights and duties
associated with the right of possession of a corpse. Not
providing for individuals to legally refuse autopsies on their
own body may also simply reflect the fact that it is rare for
someone to indicate a refusal to be autopsied before her own
death.
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In states like New York, laws requiring consent for autopsy,
like the other laws examined in this section, exemplify a legal
right to posthumous bodily integrity. Laws requiring consent
for autopsy are equally consistent with only the living or also the
dead having an interest in posthumous bodily integrity. The
living have critical interests in the treatment of their corpse,
including its dissection for autopsy, and if those interests
survive death, dead individuals would have a similar interest in
how their cadaver is treated. As always, however, the argument
for requiring consent is somewhat stronger if the dead and the
living both have an interest in posthumous bodily integrity.
F. THE LONG DEAD
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147. BDRC, RESEARCH INTO ISSUES SURROUNDING HUMAN BONES IN MUSEUMS
(2009).
148. TIFFANY JENKINS, CONTESTING HUMAN REMAINS IN MUSEUM COLLECTIONS
127 (2011).
149. HAW. REV. STAT. § 327-38(c)(1) (2012).
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I conclude with one context in which posthumous bodily
integrity receives very little legal protection: that is, in relation to
the long dead. Museums frequently contain displays of ancient
human remains, and these are generally much less controversial
than Body Worlds-type exhibits. Most people have no objection
to the display of the bodies of the long dead. In a survey
conducted in the United Kingdom by English Heritage,
approximately 90% of respondents claimed to be comfortable
with displaying prehistoric human bodies in museums.147
Evidence of this acceptance also comes from the fact that
exhibits of human remains are among the most popular.148
Further evidence is that the new Hawaii law banning the display
of corpses for commercial purposes excludes the bodies of those
who have been dead for more than 80 years.149
Part of the reason why Body Worlds is more controversial
than a museum mummy exhibit may relate to the way in which
bodies are displayed. In the former, bodies are artistically
posed, being made to appear to be exploding or performing a
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150. Jason Rhodes, Body Worlds Plans Cadaver Show Dedicated to Sex, REUTERS,
Sept. 11, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58A4Z220090911.
151. Strictly speaking it is not display that would be prohibited under
anatomical gift legislation. Rather, Body Worlds has no right to the body in the first
place in the absence of consent. Given that Body Worlds preserves bodies for the
purpose of putting them on public display, it is arguable that consent would be
insufficient unless it contemplated display. However, many current donors do not
leave instructions as to how to display their bodies, “dismissing this as vanity.” See
Jason Rhodes, Body Worlds Plans Cadaver Show Dedicated to Sex, REUTERS, Sept. 11,
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58A4Z220090911.
152. See SPERLING, supra note 18, at 108–110, for an examination of the long
dead exception to the no property rule regarding human remains.
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trapeze routine. One recent controversy even involved corpses
posed in sexual positions.150 The bodies are highly manipulated,
both in terms of the polymers that are introduced into the body
and the manner of display.
However, much of the difference in the degree of
controversy surely relates to the timeline involved.
The
deceased on display in Body Worlds have all died within the past
few decades, and many have living relatives. Ancient mummies
and other prehistoric human remains are long dead. Not only is
no one alive who knew them in life, but in many cases their
culture and way of life no longer exists. They are truly foreign
to us. It is surely no coincidence that the Hawaii legislation
exempts bodies of those dead 80 years or more, 80 years being a
person’s approximate life span. We can infer that the reason for
choosing 80 years was to ensure the impossibility of viewing, on
display in a museum, the body of someone one knew in life.
Simply put, the law allows the display of ancient corpses in
museums without the individuals’ prior consent but, assuming
anatomical gift legislation governs the procurement of corpses
for these exhibits, does not allow the display of the recently dead
without consent.151 This can perhaps be explained in part by the
fact that there are property rights in long dead corpses but not in
recently dead ones.152
U.S. federal laws governing the treatment of ancient human
remains focus on two issues: what to do if ancient remains are
discovered, and the repatriation of remains – especially Native
American remains – in the possession of others. The federal
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25 U.S.C. § 3001–13 (1991).
25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (1991).
25 U.S.C. §§ 3003, 3005(a) (1991).
See 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(4) (1991).
See discussion supra Parts IV.A–B.
See discussion supra Part IV.E.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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154.
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157.
158.
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Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
(hereinafter NAGPRA)153 provides that Native Americans have
the best claim to the remains of Native Americans newly
discovered on federal or tribal land.154 It also provides that
federal institutions in possession of the remains of Native
Americans must inventory them, notify the Native American
group to which the deceased belonged, if possible, and return
the remains to the Native American group if requested to do
so.155 Note that the Act does not require the repatriation of the
remains of non-Native Americans – of ancient mummies for
example.156 (Although the reality is that any ancient remains
newly discovered in the United States will be those of Native
Americans, U.S. federal institutions may well be in possession of
ancient remains of non-Native Americans).
A thorough discussion of the law governing the treatment
of ancient remains is beyond the scope of this article, but what is
important to note about NAGPRA is that it does not require the
prior consent of the individuals whose remains are at issue for
any of the permitted actions. Of course, obtaining such prior
consent is impossible in the case of ancient remains, and so it
makes a certain amount of sense to focus on the wishes of
descendants. However, NAGPRA differs from laws such as the
UAGA in that it contains no default rule that no interferences
are permitted without the consent of the deceased or of a
surviving family member. Under the UAGA, a failure to find a
relative who can give consent means that organ donation or
medical research cannot legally occur.157 The same is true in
many states regarding autopsy (subject to certain exceptions).158
Certainly cryonic preservation or display in a Body Worlds
exhibit are impermissible without consent.159
Under the
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NAGPRA, however, an inability to find a “culturally affiliated”
group160 triggers obligations but does not necessarily preclude
display or research on the remains.161
Another difference is that cultural affiliation need not be
based on genetic or other family ties. Although the reliance on a
broader concept of cultural affiliation may simply reflect
evidentiary difficulties in proving a genetic relationship, it
appears also to reflect a desire to respect cultural traditions,
values and beliefs regarding the dead. In repatriating bodies to
Native American groups culturally affiliated with those former
people, the law is not only saying that it is for those people’s
direct descendants to decide what happens to the body, but that
the bodies should be treated in a culturally appropriate way.
The law does not appear to protect an individual’s interest in
bodily integrity – it protects the cultural descendants’ interests
in disposing of their dead according to their own custom. As
discussed above, there are laws that protect the interests of
society in the dignified treatment of human remains (the
requirement to dispose of corpses in a dignified manner, for
example). NAGPRA appears to reflect a desire to protect this
kind of interest rather than an interest in posthumous bodily
integrity.
Thus, laws in relation to the bodies of the long dead do not
appear to protect an interest in posthumous bodily integrity.
The theories of interests of the living and the dead in the
treatment of their own corpses may help to explain why the law
treats the long dead differently than the recently dead regarding
posthumous bodily integrity. If an interest in posthumous
bodily integrity belongs only to the living, those interests expire
when the individual does. We have seen that in that case,
respecting people’s wishes is important not because we owe any
duties to the dead, but because we wish to give confidence to the
living that their own wishes will be respected. In addition, it is
wrong to break promises even if it is not a wrong to the
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deceased.
Non-consensual interferences with the bodies of the long
dead may pose less of a threat to the living than interferences
with the recently dead and do not implicate broken promises.
Those who exhibit ancient Egyptian mummies, of course, did
not promise those ancient Egyptian people that their wishes not
to be disturbed would be respected, and so no promises have
been broken. In terms of giving confidence to the living that
their wishes will be respected, it is easier for us to identify with
the recently dead, and especially those whom we knew
personally, than with ancient corpses. We may not personally
want our future corpses put on display, but the display of an
Egyptian mummy does not make us fear that our own wishes
regarding our corpses will be ignored. This is not only because
we are less able to relate to the ancient dead, but also because
the law protects us differently than it protects the ancient dead.
We can, therefore, fulfill the critical interests of the currently
living in not having their future cadavers put on display while
still placing ancient corpses on display.
However, putting ancient corpses on display may be more
problematic if the dead have an ongoing interest in bodily
integrity, depending on the approach taken to the interests of the
dead. According to Smolensky, the interests of the dead can
only stay the same over time or diminish.162 This view derives
from Kramer’s theory of interests in which the dead have
interests only because, and to the extent that, the living have
knowledge of specific deceased people.163 For example, dead
people such as one’s grandmother or Shakespeare continue to
have interests because they live on in the minds of the living,
whereas those who are dead and forgotten have none.
According to this approach, it makes sense to view the interests
of the dead as diminishing – or at least disappearing – over time,
although it is not clear how this actually works. Do a dead
person’s interests remain so long as one person remembers her?
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Do they diminish in degree or do they exist fully until the
deceased is no longer remembered by anyone? Regardless, it is
clear that according to Kramer’s theory, the dead will have no
interests once they are completely forgotten.
Since no one now exists who knew the ancient dead
personally, and most ancient dead are anonymous, a SmolenskyKramer approach would suggest that those decedents lost their
interest in posthumous bodily integrity centuries ago. As former
human beings, we should treat their bodies with respect (which
may or may not argue against their public display), but they,
themselves, no longer have any moral claim to bodily integrity.
An interesting issue arises, however, in relation to the
ancient dead who were not anonymous. Much is known about
certain ancient Egyptian Pharaohs: Ramses II and Tutankhamen
continue to exist in the minds of at least some. Have they then
retained their interest in posthumous bodily integrity? If so, this
raises a number of questions, not pursued further here, about
why the famous dead should have different moral claims to
bodily integrity than the anonymous dead. It also raises the
question whether interests can be lost with anonymity, but then
regained if new information comes to light. Suffice it to say that
even the theory of interests of the dead proposed by Smolensky
and Kramer cannot fully account for our treatment of the ancient
dead because we do not apply different consent requirements to
the ancient dead depending on whether they are anonymous or
known.
Feinberg and Pitcher’s ante-mortem person theory of the
rights of the dead fit even less well with our law and practices in
relation to the long dead. Recall that according to these
approaches it is not clear that the interests of the dead in their
bodily integrity would ever diminish or disappear.164 If their
interests are independent of people’s knowledge and memory of
the dead, they could presumably persist indefinitely.
If the dead have interests that do not diminish over time,
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then there is no reason to treat the ancient dead differently from
the recently dead in relation to their interest in bodily integrity
(unless the competing interests of the living take on greater
weight over time, but it is not clear why this would be so).
Extrapolating from Feinberg and Pitcher, we should seek to
determine what the ancient dead person would have wanted
and respect those wishes absent a compelling reason to do
otherwise. If we are unable to determine what the person would
have wanted, we should err on the side of caution and limit any
interferences with the corpse – especially ones that most people
would not agree to, such as public display. This would lead to
the conclusion that unless other benefits of exhibits, for example
educational value, are such as to outweigh the deceased’s
interest in posthumous bodily integrity, we should not exhibit
an Egyptian mummy’s corpse in a museum. This is especially so
given that it is inferable based on ancient Egyptian culture and
the efforts that were made to protect the tombs of mummies that
the ancient Egyptians did not want their corpses put on public
display.
To summarize, the law treats ancient corpses differently
than those of the recently dead. The former may be the subject
of research or educational display without the consent of the
deceased or her relatives. No such conduct is legally permissible
in relation to the recently dead without the prior consent of the
deceased or the substitute consent of the next of kin. The
theories underlying an interest in posthumous bodily integrity
provide different explanations for why this may be the case. If
only the living have an interest in posthumous bodily integrity,
then non-consensual actions in relation to an ancient corpse do
not violate that interest any more than non-consensual actions in
relation to the recently dead violate the interest. The difference
lies in the need to give the living confidence that their wishes
will be respected after death. Since the ancient dead were not,
while alive, subject to modern legal regimes, and because we do
not as readily identify with the ancient dead than with the
recently dead, treating the ancient dead differently does not
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threaten people’s confidence that their own wishes will be
respected after their deaths.
If the dead themselves have an ongoing interest in
posthumous bodily integrity, it may still make sense to treat the
ancient dead differently if posthumous interests are tied to the
deceased living on in the knowledge and memory of the living.
Assuming that the ancient dead are anonymous, their
posthumous interests have expired. However, if the ancient
dead are not anonymous, or if we take a view of posthumous
interests that does not require the dead to live on in the memory
of the living, it is harder to explain why the ancient dead should
be granted little or no right to posthumous bodily integrity
when the recently dead have significant rights in relation to the
same interests.
V. CONCLUSION
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Laws granting a right to posthumous bodily integrity
demonstrate that American society considers it appropriate to let
individuals make many decisions about what will happen to
their own dead bodies, even in the face of compelling competing
interests, such as those of potential organ recipients. Given the
widespread nature of Americans’ right to make binding
decisions about the treatment of their corpses it could be argued
that a general right to posthumous bodily integrity exists;
although, it is not my aim to argue for the existence of such a
general right, especially given variation between states on some
issues, such as the ability to decide how one’s body will be
disposed or the ability to refuse an autopsy. It is important to
note, however, that the legal right to make decisions about the
treatment of one’s corpse is not narrow or limited, for example,
to the organ donation context. Rather, the law sets out a wide
range of contexts in which, within reason, individuals have
priority in deciding what happens to their own bodies after
death.
It is often unclear, however, whether these laws derive from
a view that the dead, themselves, have sufficient moral status to
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be deserving of an ongoing right to posthumous bodily
integrity; or whether they derive from a view that the dead have
insufficient moral status, but that it is nevertheless important for
the living to have confidence that their wishes regarding the
treatment of their corpses will be respected. To the extent that a
right to posthumous bodily integrity applies even to those
whose wishes are unknown, this is easier to reconcile with the
view that the dead have an ongoing interest in posthumous
bodily integrity. However, the different treatment of the ancient
and recent dead is more consistent with a view that only the
living have an interest in posthumous bodily integrity.
It is impossible to say with any certainty whether the
bearers of legal rights to posthumous bodily integrity are the
dead or only the living because: a) legislators appear not to have
explicitly considered the issue in enacting laws; and b) there are
often multiple possible explanations for the law’s requirements.
For example, the fact that the UAGA requires consent for organ
donation even from those whose wishes are unknowable could
reflect a view that the dead have an interest in posthumous
bodily integrity, that in that situation families’ interest in
deciding what should happen to the corpses of their family
members is entitled to considerable weight, or that a law that
drew a distinction on the basis of whether one’s wishes are
knowable would be politically unpalatable.
Thus, any conclusions drawn from the structure of these
laws as to whether the dead are viewed as rights-holders are
speculative.
However, the value of the exercise is to
demonstrate the moral implications of different interferences
with a corpse depending on the approach one takes to the
identity of the rights-holder. With this analysis in place, a
legislator or member of the public who has a view about
whether the dead are properly bearers of rights (and if so, what
kinds of rights) can make policy arguments that properly
balance the protection of posthumous bodily integrity against
competing interests in the treatment of a corpse. By considering
whose interest in posthumous bodily integrity was being
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protected and why, lawmakers might find ways to increase the
supply of donor organs or research cadavers without causing
any additional harm to recognized interests. For example, if we
agreed that the dead have no interests, we would presumably
consider it more acceptable to take the organs of those whose
wishes, while alive, are unknown. Alternately, if the dead do
have interests, legislators might choose to give greater legal
protection to the bodies of the ancient dead. They might
institute bans on public display where it could reasonably be
inferred that the deceased would have opposed display, as is the
case with Bodies: The Exhibition.
In focusing on individuals’ interest in posthumous bodily
integrity, the aim has not been to suggest that this should be the
only, or even the primary, basis for setting policy regarding the
treatment of corpses. The arguments above are not inconsistent
with a view that we should conscript organs, even in the face of
opposition, or that Body Worlds-type displays are undignified.
This article has little to say about how much weight should be
given to a right to posthumous bodily integrity when it conflicts
with competing rights. Rather, it has shown that there are
implications for moral conduct, and thus for policy, in relation to
dead bodies that flow from how one construes an interest in
posthumous bodily integrity. If the dead have no interests – if
they cannot be the proper subject of rights because they do not
have sufficient moral status – then our treatment of corpses
cannot harm the dead. It can, of course, hurt the living in
various ways, but not the dead. If that is the case, then the only
reason to abide by the wishes of the dead is to benefit the living
– either living individuals who care that their own corpses will
be treated in a certain way, living members of a society that
wants to be the kind of society that respects the wishes of the
dead, living people who stand to benefit from donated organs or
medical research, or living loved ones of the deceased who have
a stake in how the corpse is treated. If, however, the dead
continue to have a moral stake in the treatment of their bodies,
they have a claim to a certain kind of treatment even if we don’t
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know what treatment they actually wanted for their corpses.
Posthumous bodily integrity clearly matters, but it is
unclear why. If we could agree as to why it matters, we could
enact laws to protect it in a more principled and consistent
manner. Even if we cannot agree, we can at least be clear about
what it is we are trying to achieve in enacting laws that protect
posthumous bodily integrity.
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